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ABSTRACT 
The intraindustry trade, multiple posttrade equilibria and multiple pretrade equilibria 
almost invalidate the role of the terms of trade as a divider of trade gains and as a 
predictor of the direction of trade. The indices of international trade benefits (ITB), which 
will be developed in this paper, aim at complementing what the terms of trade lacks as 
well as making it possible to utilize the estimated trade gains in a meaningful manner. 
The indices relatively measure the portion that a trading country takes out of whole trade 
benefits created by all trading countries at a given moment rather than recognize the 
absolute level of trade benefits for each of trading countries. The outcome values of indices 
state the extent of how favorably a country is conducting international trades with its 
partner country as compared with other countries whether the absolute level of trade 
benefits is on the increase or on the decrease. In fact, they also show the level of trade 
benefits that a certain country achieves from the increase of one dollar's worth of trade 
with its trading partner country. 
The indices of measuring the trade gains consist of basic ITB, principal ITB and 
complementary ITB indices. Basic ITB indices suggest the potential benefits embedded in 
one dollar's worth of trade. The product of basic ITB indices and trade volume factor of 
individual trading country equals principal ITB indices, which help settle such questions 
as which country gains the biggest benefits and gives the biggest benefits. Complementary 
ITB indices provide information necessary to confirm the status of an individual country in 
the international trade market. 
As a result of analyzing the internal trade between fifteen EU member countries, it proves 
true that the indices are effective in terms of measuring the trade gains distributed across 
countries. 
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I. Introduction 
Industrial countries account for most of world trade, and their trade 
volumes have kept an increasing trend. Furthermore, it is noticeable that major 
industrial countries including the US have become increasingly similar in their 
relative factor supplies. It means that a large part of international trade is taking 
place in the form of two-way trade within an industry, thus, the so-called 
intraindustry trade that is primarily based on economies of scale and product 
differentiation. In other words, most of trades between industrial countries are not 
related to comparative advantage and are carried out irrespective of the price 
differentiaF· 3. 
The likelihood that the company can get scale economies through trade 
will be higher, the larger the size of the company. Scale economies oriented to the 
company level are called internal economies of scale. These internal economies of 
scale make it possible to bring up monopolistic competition and intraindustry 
trade with differentiated products'. Whether or not the gains from this type of 
2 See MiklOs Koren (2003), "Financial Globalization, Portfolio Diversification, and the Pattern of 
International Trade," IMF WP/03/233. "The trade structure of countries with fully liberalized capital 
accounts (such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Singapore, the UK and the US) depends less on their 
relative productivity. A possible explanation is that the Ricardian trade model works less for these 
highly developed countries in which there is an important role of product differentiation, imperfect 
competition and intraindustry trade." 
3 See David Hummels and Peter J. Klenow (2002), "The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Trade," 
NBER WP No. 8712. 1his paper presents empirical evidences that "larger economies export in more 
product categories and are more likely to export in small categories". These empirical evidences 
imply that larger economies are apt to be engaged in international trade with differentiated products. 
4 See Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld (2003)~ International Economics(Theory andPolicy)~ 
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international trade are reaped by individual economies can be confirmed by 
comparing the utility levels produced in free trade to those in autarky. 
Determining the level of trade gains belonging in the intraindustry trade has 
nothing to do with the terms of trade at all. However, the already-developed 
utility functions require complicated processes to gauge the trade gains for each of 
trading countries. It also looks problematic to measure the trade gains of 
individual trading countries based on the principle that the variety of trade goods 
available to consumers substantially contributes to the increase in the utility levels 
of importing countries. 
Monopolistic competition in product differentiation can be expected to 
bring a lower average price to consumers if lower costs on the supplier side and 
limited substitutions between differentiated products on the consumer side are 
taken into account. In principle, monopolistic competitors are not real monopolists, 
but they behave like monopolists, seek maximum profits and try not to allow 
consumers to benefit from the reduced price even if lower costs stem from 
economies of scale. It convincingly suggests that the variety of goods must be a 
dominant source to improve the utility level in importing countries engaged in the 
intraindustry trade. 
Now, suppose, for example, that one country imports a large volume of a 
few goods from other countries, and another country has the same volume of 
import even though it imports many kinds of goods, while both countries have 
Addison Wesley, Ch. 6, pp.120-155. 
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different tastes on goods. If the former country funnels the financial resources 
secured through the import-related industries into diversifying non-trade goods, 
it should be concluded that the variety in this country is also as importantly 
sought as that in the latter country. It shows there must be some constraints in 
capturing the effect of international trade on the national welfare of importing 
countries by checking the change in the variety of trade goods. 
In contrast, the exporting countries engaged in the intraindustry trade 
apparently get the gains to see they are provided with higher productivity and 
lower costs as a result of producing goods at a larger scale (Melitz [2002] and 
Choudhri and Hakura [2000]). Given all these circumstances, it is true that 
international trade based on internal economies of scale and product 
differentiation clearly causes the increase not only in the world output but also in 
the worldwide variety of trade goods. At the same time, it is quite an onerous task 
to assess the trade gains for each of trading countries individually and compare 
them between the countries concerned. 
Economies of scale applying at the level of industry, i.e., external 
economies of scale, significantly influence international trade as well. External 
economies of scale occur when favorable conditions such as specialized suppliers, 
labor market pooling, knowledge spillovers and so forth are concentrated on a 
certain industry. Particularly, a country with a large industry can be more easily in 
. . . 
a position to have external economies of scale than a country with a small industry. 
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External economies of scale, ceteris paribus, not only tend to define the pattern of 
interindustry trade but also strengthen the existing comparative advantage in the 
production of a trading country and, in some cases, make it possible that a country 
with potentially low comparative advantage will come to dominate the world 
market. The industry subject to external economies of scale consists of many 
companies to pursue their own business under perfectly competitive conditions. 
Competition induces companies to cut down on the average prices, and lower 
costs are also available due to economies of scale at the level of industry. It is 
obvious that the industry subject to external economies of scale is a valuable 
source to increase gains to the world economy (as in Krugman and Obstfeld 
[2003]). 
Meanwhile, when a country benefits from this type of increasing return to 
scale to favorably affect all the countrywide industries and its trading partner 
country also experiences similar kinds of industrial standing, two countries can 
neither confirm the gains from international trade nor predict the direction of 
trade by relying on the terms of trade even if comparative advantage causes 
international trade between them. International trade between two countries 
subject to external economies of scale lets them face the trade relationship with 
multiple equilibria5• This expresses that, if there are no any interventions by the 
governments, it is almost impossible to identify a. stable equilibrium point in 
5 See Miltiades Chacholiades (1978), International Trade Theory and Policy, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Ch. 7, pp.193-199. 
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international trade between countries. Thus, the terms of trade corresponding to 
the relative price ratio set at the equilibrium point can neither appropriately 
function as a divider of the trade gains nor a predictor of the direction of trade 
because of the instability of equilibrium point, which can presumably be 
intensified by the trend of free trade in the world market. It is also noted that 
multiple equilibria resulting from the inelasticity of demand for imports of trading 
countries with the industries subject to constant return to scale or decreasing 
return to scale can invoke the same kinds of problems. Besides, multiple pretrade 
equilibria, which show up when the assumption of identical and logical taste has 
been violated, can place the terms of trade outside the range of the pretrade price 
ratios of the two trading countries, and result in negating the classical conclusions 
regarding the direction of trade (as in Chacholiades [1978]). 
Hausman and Rodrick (2002) argued that entrepreneurship to learn what 
one is good at producing under given circumstances and to discover what place is 
an attractive market can also trigger international trade regardless of comparative 
advantage and economies of scale. In this case, a starter of a specific business line 
acts as a monopolist during the initiating period and, if impossible to do so, he 
does not feel interested in launching a new business. In terms of monopolistic 
behaviors, this type of international trade seems similar to that based on internal 
economies of scale. Anyhow, the terms of trade cannot be used as a tool to divide 
the trade gains between countries concerned with this type of international trade, 
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either. 
Most economies of the world have a number of industries, and the 
production function of each of their industries incorporates increasing return to 
scale, constant return to scale or decreasing return to scale in compliance with 
their economic and social conditions including overall factor endowments and etc. 
All companies are mostly in a competition with each other to duke out in both the 
domestic and international markets. These economic developments also suggest 
that the production possibility frontiers for the economy are put in such volatile 
states that it is very hard to identify a stable equilibrium point in the international 
trade. 
What motivates trading companies, in addition to a positive financial 
profit, to do international transactions comprises many factors such as expanding 
market shares, obtaining new skills and technologies, securing long-term cash 
flows and reducing financial risk by internalizing the diverse overseas markets. 
Given that all countries' economic conditions are different from one another, those 
benefits cannot be perfectly valued through being reflected in the price of trade 
goods if one price applies to the world market. Therefore, the terms of trade 
cannot properly play its part in the process of dividing trade benefits between 
countries. Besides, to have the terms of trade improved as a result of a rise in the 
price of export goods does not necessarily guarantee a better financial gain 
because of the possibility that the production costs including labor wage, part 
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price and maintenance expense rise up higher. A good profit could rather tum up, 
without raising the price, only by lowering the costs through the introduction of 
new manufacturing technologies and innovation of management systems. 
Conclusively, I do point out that a new tool to gauge and divide the trade 
gains needs to be developed so as to not only complement what the terms of trade 
lacks but also to make it possible to utilize the estimated trade gains in a 
meaningful manner. This paper presents an alternative approach to readily 
measure the trade gains distributed across countries engaged in international 
trade. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II provides 
with a theoretical setup to focus on the broadly defined concept of trade gains, to 
construct the indices of international trade benefits, and to apply methodological 
analyses to the constitutions of indices. Chapter III introduces enhanced usages of 
indices in a way to identify the trade gains of a certain country in relative terms. 
The applications of all indices to trading activities and their interpretations show 
up in Chapter IV. The effectiveness of the indices' measuring power and 
concluding remarks are offered in Chapter V. 
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II. Theoretical Setup 
A. Gains from International Trade 
This paper defines for its own purpose that the gains from international 
trade and international trade benefits (ITB) have the same meanings, and can be 
used interchangeably. What's more, it analyzes the gains from international trade 
with a focus on trade in goods. Therefore, discussing the conceptual framework of 
ITB starts with tackling a challenge to find out how the economic value of trade 
goods can be created. 
How valuable the goods will be in economic terms must be basically up to 
the input level of labor and capital, innovative ideas, availability of information, 
improved technologies and skills, competitiveness of organizational systems and 
etc. There are more factors influencing expected economic value' of trade goods, 
which are also different depending on whether they are export goods or import 
goods. Firstly, in case of exports, economies of scale (and economies of scope) 
resulting from the expansion of market share, higher profits by accessing the large 
international market, avoidance of replication of R&D efforts, securing long-term 
cash flow and reducing financial risk by internalizing the diverse overseas market 
6 The expected economic value can be divided into two sectors such as a positive economic payoff 
and a welfare economic payoff. The positive economic payoff is valued by the price mechanism in 
financial terms, but the welfare economic payoff corresponds to economic values that the price 
mechanism misses and that cannot be appropriately reflected in the price. There will be more 
discussions on these terminologies in the next section. 
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can be considered as additional economic value factors 7 • Secondly, imports• 
provide an increasing variety in consumer's goods, intermediate goods and capital 
equipments, increasing the consumption of consumer's goods and the 
employment of intermediate goods and capital equipments at a low price and 
acquiring advanced technologies in the form of embodied capital goods, on top of 
the basic factors creating expected economic values. Thirdly, improving the 
efficiency in allocating and utilizing the resources and goods comes up to increase 
the economic values of the world, which is neither embedded in goods themselves 
nor directly affecting the price, regardless of export or import, but is related to 
trade volumes. Fourthly, a rise in the employment of labor and capital through 
international trade is also regarded as another value, which is only partly reflected 
in the price as a consequence of paying out wages and rents, but its good 
contribution to the social stability is not counted. 
Even though the expected economic values of trade goods largely derive 
from many value-generating factors, their financial values are in the end 
determined by the demand of consumers in the market. It is also worth noting that 
the price mechanism in the market does not perfectly work because of imperfect 
7 See Athanasios Vamvakidis (1999), "Regional Trade Agreements or Broad Liberalization: Which 
Path Leads to Faster Growth?," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 46, No. I, Ehsan U. Choudhri and Dalia S. 
Hakura (2000), "International Trade and Productivity Growth: Exploring the Sectoral Effects for 
Developing Countries/' IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 47, No.1, Gunnar Jonsson and Arvind Subramanian, 
2001, "Dynamic Gains from Trade: Evidence from South Africa," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 48, No. 1, and 
MiklOs Koren (2003), "Financial Globalization, Portfolio Diversification, and the Pattern of 
International Trade/' IMF WP/03/233. 
s Refer to footnote 7. 
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competitions, trade barriers and unique natures of international trade. All these 
connections and causations imply that only individuals such as exporters, 
importers or consumers rather than markets can correctly measure the 
international trade benefits stemming from expected economic values. That is, a 
change in the aggregate utility level of trade-related parties in each of trading 
countries determines the levels of international trade benefits much closer to the 
original economic values than the terms of trade between trading countries does. 
The changes in the level of domestic income, consumption or trade 
volume of each trading country could be adopted to indicate the changes in the 
aggregate utility level of trade for that country. In fact, many researchers have 
already employed them to measure the utility level empirically. An increase in the 
aggregate utility level of trade, i.e., the gains from international trade, is also 
associated with conflicts of interest within a country as well as between countries. 
In case of a large country, the conflicts of interest within a country more strongly· 
influence the process of formulating the trade policy than those between countries. 
The trade policies of large countries would often make a major alteration to 
commercial practices in the international trade market. Nevertheless, a small 
country usually faces the opposite situation of a large country. It signifies that the 
trade gains of large countries can be better measured by checking a change in the 
level of domestic income or consumption after trade while the trade gains of small 
countries are appropriately confirmed by watching the international trade per se. 
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However, given the ongoing changes in the international trade 
environments toward the worldwide integration for the expansion of free trade 
benefits, most countries in this world will prefer to facilitate international trade 
through multilateral trade agreements such as GATI and WTO. When the 
international trade practices have been established through multilateral 
negotiations, the conflicts of interest within a country, most of which are closely 
related to the problems of domestic income or consumption, are not supposed to 
go beyond the national border 9 except the special cases 10 that require the 
settlements in accordance with the terms and conditions of multilateral trade 
agreements. Assuming that large countries as well as small countries pursue their 
international trade activities agreeably to the multilateral trade agreements and do 
not try to solve their internal problems in a way to affect international trade, it 
looks more reasonable to assess the gains from international trade based on the 
trend in the trade volurne11 rather than the change in the level of income or 
consumption. The income and consumption can be easily affected by many kinds 
9 See Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern (1994), "Multilateral Trade Negotiations and 
Preferential Trading Arrangements (Analytical and negotiating issues in the global trading systems~ 
Ch. 2),u University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 46. " Since individual nations have agreed to 
certain obligations and have been guaranteed certain rights as a condition of their membership in the 
GAIT, their acceptance of GAIT dispute settlement will of necessity lead to overriding the 
opp~sition of domestic interest groups. In this way, national autonomy and sovereignty have to be 
superseded in order to enhance global welfare." 
10 The escape clause in GAIT and WTO like safeguards measures helps settle the conflicts of interest 
between countries regardless of whether imports have benefited from unfair trade behaviors. The 
antidumping rules and the rules on subsidies and countervailing duties are in force as international 
laws for the settlement of disputes between countries primarily related to unfair trade behaviors. 
11 The trade volume should be defined only in amount to meet an analytical reasoning for this paper. 
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of domestic economic and social factors, which have not:illng to do with 
international trade. By contrast, on the one hand, the price and quantity of trade 
goods are greatly influenced by the demand and supply of foreign trading 
countries over those goods. On the other, they are affected by the conditions of 
domestic production and demand. This verifies again that the trade volume must 
be more workable as a vehicle to measure the ITBs. Of course, the domestic 
income and consumption cannot be free from the impact of foreign economic 
fluctuations, but they are far less affected than the trade volume. 
J. E. Meade (1955) developed a simple index of welfare to assess the 
welfare effect of customs union relying on the fact that an increase in the trade 
volume raises the level of welfare and a decrease in the trade volume lowers it12• 
Carsten Kowalczyk (1990) used the trade volume as a primary factor to analyze 
the welfare of customs union and confirmed its effects of positive contribution13• 
Robert Feenstra (1990) also focused on the change in the trade volume to identify 
12 See j. E. Meade (1955), The Theory of Customs Unions, North-Holland Publishing Company 
(Amsterdam), Ch.III-N. Meade conducts his analysis with a basic principle that the consumer's price 
is higher by tax than the producer's price and when a commodity is transferred from producer to 
consumer, it raises welfare by the difference between the producer's marginal disutility and the 
consumer's marginal utility, i.e., tax. Meade replaces tax with tariff for international trades and 
constitutes a welfare index as following; (l)add all increases in trade weighted by tariff rates, (2)add 
all decreases in trade weighted by tariff rates, (3)subtract (2) from (I) and then (3) result is Meade's 
welfare index. If the index is positive, welfare has increased and vice versa. Increases or decreases in 
trade correspond to changes in trade after the formation of customs union. Tariff rates are those that 
were effective before the formation of customs union. R. G. Lipsey(1970) argued that Meade's welfare 
index becomes useless when tariff rates are highly reduced after the formation of customs union. 
However, he did not negate the intrinsic property of trade volume to capacitate us to capture the 
gains from international trade (See Miltiades Chacholiades (1978), International Trade Theory and 
Policy, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Ch. 22, pp.559-561). 
13 See Carsten Kowalczyk (1999), "Welfare and Customs Unions," NBER WP No. 3476 (Cambridge, 
Massachusettes: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
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the trade gains14• All these analyses and research evidences ensure that the trend 
in trade volume prevails as regards measuring the gains from international trade. 
The failures of price mechanism unreasonably influence the trade volume 
as well since it corresponds to the product of quantity multiplied by price. It is 
clear that they could not be problems if all the trade volumes for a series of 
periods are quoted by the base price. Additionally, if the gains from international 
trades are measured by relatively comparing trade volumes in amount between 
countries, or by deriving the trend of international trade through relative 
comparison, the problems related to the dysfunction of price mechanism will be 
crossed out to get the desired results in the end. 
B. Constructing ITB Indices 
Basic concept and structure of index 
The previous section makes clear only that the gains from international 
trade can be measured by analyzing the trend in the trade volume, but it has not 
mentioned a detailed process and methodological analysis necessary to obtain 
valuable outcomes. This section introduces an in-depth discussion on how to use 
the trade volume to size up the gains from international trade, which have already 
been distributed across trading countries. 
14 See Robert Feenstra (1990)/ "Distributing the Gains from Trade with Incomplete Information," 
NBER WP No. 3277 (Cambridge, Massachusettes: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
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Beforehand, it is assumed that every trading company is voluntarily 
engaged in free international trade to seek its own trade benefits. Thus, a trading 
company has an unlimited freedom to choose trade goods, can definitely quit an 
international market anytime if it is impossible to acquire what it wants from 
international trade, and will increase the volume of international trade when it 
looks continuously certain to materialize what it wants from international trade. 
What it wants here means the expected economic values consisting of a positive 
economic payoff and a welfare economic payoff as pointed out in the previous 
section. Even when there is no positive economic payoff, international trade 
continues to take place if there is enough welfare economic payoff to make up for 
the loss of positive economic payoff. The judgment of whether there will be 
enough compensation or not should be made by an individual trade-related party. 
Anyone of trade-related parties could by assumption stop any activities related to 
international trade if he is not satisfied with the consequence of his own prior 
comprehensive assessments. Moreover, it is also assumed that the trade benefits of 
each of trade-related parties must be not only cardinally measurable but also 
comparable for the analytical purpose of this paper.15 
The trade volume in amount, for example, will not be able to be on the 
increase as a result of the fall in the price even when the traders keep increasing 
their trade quantity to pursue their own interests. In some cases, despite .the 
15 See Miltiades Chacholiades (1978), International Trade Theory and Policy, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Ch. 22, pp.560. 
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increase of trade quantity, the trade volume in amount can be on the decrease due 
to the drastic drop in the price or vice versa. Whatever situations they are put in, 
the traders, in principle, try to maximize their benefits through trading businesses. 
So, increasing the trade volume in quantity in spite of the fall in the price cannot 
be judged to stick to a losing game because there are some trade benefits not 
reflected in the price. 
A time series of international trade volumes provides, through analyzing 
the changing trend, valuable information on whether ITB increases or decreases. 
However, such a time serial analysis cannot bring about any desirable results 
when there is no change in the trend of target data. Besides, when international 
trade is just initiated between countries, a time serial analysis itself is impossible. 
However, it is true that ITB is apparently embedded in the volume of international 
trade even in two afore-mentioned cases. 
To overcome all the constraints and measure the trade gains, which have 
already been allocated across trading countries, it proves effective to compare the 
trade volume of a certain country with that of each of all its trading partner 
countries at a given moment. That is, it means to constitute the index of 
international trade benefits based on the relative comparison of trade flow 
between trading countries. Let us choose two countries A and B as representative 
ones out of the whole international trading community and take a look at the trade 
flows between them. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the international trade flows among A, B and other 
countries. E•b shows country ks export volume toward country B and E•o suggests 
country ks export volume toward other countries. I•b and I•o indicate country ks 
import volumes from country B and other countries. Eb•, po, Jb• and Jbo point to 
country B's export and import volumes exactly in the same way as applied to 
country A. Eob, Eo• and Eo refer to total export volumes of other countries toward 
country B, country A and other countries themselves respectively. l0 ', Iob and Io also 
indicate total import volumes of other countries from country A, country B and 
other countries themselves. It is readily found that the trade flows can be 
displayed by either exports between trading countries or imports between them. 
<Figure 1> International Trade Flows between Countries 
Furthermore, the sum of either every country's exports or every country's 
imports demonstrates the aggregate trade volume of all trading countries when 
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tariffs, taxes and other trade-related fees have been ignored. If the trade flows are 
displayed only by exports between trading countries, country P:s index of ITB 
against country B (I(T)) can be constituted as follows; 
(Country B's index of ITB against country A: 
I(T) = [Eb•/(Eb•+ Ebo)] I [E~/(E•b+ E~+ E•)]) 
where (E•h+ E••) is country P:s total export volume and (E•h+ E••+ E•) is total export 
volume of all other countries. 
The numerator part of E•bf(E•h+ E•o) expresses the extent of how actively 
country A is engaged in international trade relations with country B. When 
country A gets more gains from international trade with country B as compared 
with any other country, it is natural that country A want to expand the trade 
relationship more aggressively with country B than with any other country. The 
increasing trade performance of country A toward country B relative to other 
countries entails a rise in the value of the numerator part of E•h/(E•b + E•o). The 
denominator part of Eobf(Eob+ Eo•+ E0 ) shows the average extent of how actively all 
other countries are engaged in international trade relations with country B. If they 
judge that the international trade with country B bring about fine benefits, other 
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countries will also try to increase international trade with it. Therefore, if I(T) ;, 1, 
country A must be enjoying quite favorable gains from the international trade with 
country B as compared with any other country. If 0 ~ I(T) < 1, country A must be 
getting unfavorable gains from international trade with country B as compared 
with any other country, or there can be no trade between two countries. If I(T) 
shows the increasing trend, it states that country /{s gains from international trade 
with country B keep improving. On the contrary, if I(T) shows the decreasing 
trend, country ks gains from international trade with country B is worsening. I(T) 
cannot be negative because it is assumed that international trade never take place 
between countries without benefits. 
I(T) ;, 1 or 0 ~ 1(1) < 1 is not related to the objectively-measured size of 
benefits which country A can acquire from the trade with country B. How 
favorable the trade with country B is to country A must be determined still only 
depending on the judgment of country A without taking into account country B's 
perspectives. 
Analysis of expected outcomes of index 
It should also be analyzed under what circumstances I(T) increases, 
decreases or holds the same level. I(T) for country A increases firstly when the 
numerator part of E•bf(E'"'+ E•o) increases much faster than the denominator part of 
Eobf(E0b+ Eo•+ Eo), secondly when the numerator part decreases much slower than 
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the denorrrinator part, thirdly when the numerator part increases meanwhile the 
denominator part keeps the same level, fourthly when the numerator part keeps 
the same level meanwhile the denorrrinator part decreases, and lastly when the 
numerator part increases meanwhile the denominator part decreases. 
In the first case, country B must be economically in an expansionary 
situation and all countries including country A are competing against each other 
to boost trade relationship with country B. Country A may be one of the most 
competitive in the market of country B. When this case has developed to be the 
third case, country A will take a big chunk out of whole trade benefits created in 
the international trade involving country B. In addition, it should be taken into 
account that the third case can tum up earlier than the first case when country B's 
economic expansion just gets started, and then it can make progress to the first 
case. 
The second case could show up when all countries rush to reduce the 
trade relationship with country B as a result of its economic downturn, but when 
country A can still exercise its bargaining power in the market of country B more 
favorably than any other country. The second case can move on to the fourth case 
or vice versa depending upon the economic condition of country B and each 
country's market status in country B. In the second and fourth cases, it draws 
attention that, despite the fact that the absolute size of whole trade benefits created 
in the international trade involving country B keeps shrinking contrary to the first 
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and third cases, country A can take a bigger chunk out of trade benefits relatively 
to other countries. Nonetheless, the absolute size of trade benefits taken by 
country A will also diminish in the end. 
The fifth case, where the numerator part increases meanwhile the 
denominator part decreases, shows that country A clearly takes a bigger chunk out 
of trade benefits relatively to other countries, but whether the absolute size of 
whole trade benefits created in the international trade involving country B 
increases or not seems highly indeterminate. 
I(T) for country A decreases when the opposite circumstances of increased 
I(T) have oc=red. When the numerator part increases much slower than the 
denominator part, I(T) for country A can be on the decrease despite that the 
absolute size of whole trade benefits created in the international trade involving 
country B keeps expanding and that the absolute size of trade benefits taken by 
country A increases as well. That the numerator part decreases faster than the 
denominator part can also make I(T) for country A and the absolute sizes of trade 
benefits decrease. When the numerator part keeps the same level or decreases 
meanwhile the denominator part increases or keeps the same level, I(T) is 
definitely on the decrease. When the numerator part decreases meanwhile the 
denominator part increases, whether the absolute sizes of whole trade benefits 
increase or not seems highly indeterminate, but I(T) for country A is on the 
decrease. 
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I(T) for country A holds the same level firstly when the numerator part 
and the denominator part don't change at all, and secondly when the numerator 
part and the denominator part both increase or decrease at the same rate. In the 
second case, even if there are no changes in the value of I(T), the absolute size of 
whole trade benefits and the absolute trade benefits taken by country A can both 
increase or decrease. 
It has been confirmed that I(T) for a certain trading country can be on the 
increase even when its absolute level of ITB decreases and vice versa. In some 
cases, I(T) has not changed at all even though the absolute level of trade benefits is 
either on the increase or on the decrease. It signifies that this index aims at 
relatively measuring the portion that a trading country takes out of whole trade 
benefits created by all trading countries at a given moment rather than 
recognizing the absolute level of trade benefits for each of trading countries. In 
other words, the outcome of index states the extent of how favorably a country is 
engaged in international trade with its trading partner country as compared with 
other countries whether the absolute level of trade benefits is on the increase or on 
the decrease. 
General forms of ITB indices 
In order to grasp the essential process of constituting the index, the 
previous sections concentrated on international trade relationship only between 
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two countries with the flow of trade only limited to export. However, in reality, 
ITB must be corning from both export and import flows, and its features are also 
different depending upon their origins as already analyzed before. Therefore, it is 
necessary to constitute the index of export benefits and the index of import 
benefits respectively to identify the unique benefits of each trade flow. In addition, 
those indices have to be constructed in a general and practical form so as to be 
applicable for the analysis of common international trade without being limited to 
specific countries. To conduct the forthcoming discussions on ITB effectively, some 
signs will be used in the equations to denote the price, quantity, commodity and 
trading country. P is a price, X a quantity of exports, M a quantity of imports, i a 
commodity and j, k or o a trading country. I is to denote the set of all trade goods 
and J to denote the set of all trading countries. Therefore, i E I, j, k and o E J and j * 
• Index of export benefits 
The export volume in amount for a certain commodity is the product of its 
export quantity multiplied by its export price. Thus, the export volume of 
commodity i is PJ<; and the total export volume of country j is 
zj/X( =X(j) for all j E J, (1) 
iEJ 
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the export volume of country j to country k is 
'L.P/X(k =X(jk) for all j and k E J, j * k, (2) 
iEJ 
the aggregate export volume of all other countries is 
LLP,0 X," =X(o) (3) 
OEJ iEJ 
the total export volume of all other countries to country k is 
L.L.r,ok x,ok = X(ok) for all 0 and k E J, 0 * k, j I< J, (4) 
OE} iEf 
where P~ and )(;i are respectively the export price of commodity i of country j and 
its export quantity, Pik and X;ik are respectively the export price of commodity i of 
country j to country k and its export quantity, p,o and )(;o are respectively the 
export price of commodity i of one of other countries (country o) and its export 
quantity and p,ok and )(;ok are respectively the export price of commodity i of 
country o to country k and its export quantity. 
Possibly, the price mechanism does not work perfectly due to imperfect 
competitions, international trade barriers and other unique natures of 
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international trade such as geographical distance, different cultures and different 
legal systems. Assuming that every country has the same kinds of market 
distortions or failures, when 8 represents all the problems related to the 
dysfunction of market for each trading country, the total export volume of country 
j should be adjusted from (1) to 
'ff/ ex ( = x (j)e, (5) 
iEJ 
All other equations (2) to ( 4) can also be modified in the same way as (5). 
Now, the level of export benefits of country j to country k at a given moment can 
be expressed in a general form as follows; 
J(E)lk = X(jk)B· X(o)B I X(j)B- X(ok)B = X(jk) · X(o)/ X(j) · X(ok) (6) 
It can be inferred from ( 6) that the market problem factor 8 does not 
seriously affect the outcome value of index when calculated by relatively 
comparing trade volumes in amount between countries. Other indices of 
international trade benefits can also be clear of 8 due to the same process shown in 
(6). The more globalized every economy in this world, the higher the possibility of 
the international market's being uniformly ruled. It seems that there will be fewer 
problems related to market mechanism in the future given the fact that the 
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globalization is unsubduedly on the move1•. 
• Index of import benefits 
The gains from imports are different in many respects from the gains from 
exports, but it is also true that they have some in common such as the input level 
of labor and capital, innovative ideas, availability of information, etc. as pointed 
out in the previous section. The basic process of constituting the index of import 
benefits and its structure are very similar to those of the index of export benefits. 
The import volume of commodity i is PM and the total import volume of 
country j is 
IJ,/M( =M(j) forallj E J, (7) 
iel 
the import volume of country j from country k is 
'f.P/' M(k = M(jk) for all j and k E J, j "'k, (8) 
iel 
the aggregate import volume of all other countries is 
16 See Arvind Subramanian and Shang-jin Wei (2003), "The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But 
Unevenly,'' IMF Working Paper. They find robust evidence that GATT/WTO has promoted world 
trade. The WTO has played a pivotal role in increasing industrial country's imports substantially and 
may have led to boost world imports by about 44% or U$3 trillion in 2000 alone. This brought about 
an increase in developing country's exports by as much as a third. 
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LL>~oM,o =M(o) (9) 
oeJ ie/ 
the total import volume of all other countries from country k is 
LLP;okM,ok =M(ok) for all o and k E J, o ;< k, j <1' J, (10) 
oeJ iel 
where P~ and Mii are respectively the import price of commodity i of country j and 
its import quantity, Pik and M;ik are respectively the import price of commodity i 
of country j from country k and its import quantity, p,o and M;O are respectively the 
import price of commodity i of one of other countries (country o) and its import 
quantity, and p,ok and M;ok are respectively the import price of commodity i of 
country o from country k and its import quantity. 
By omitting some parts of the constitution process, the level of import 
benefits of country j to country k at a given moment can be directly stated as 
follows; 
1(1)1k =M(jk)·M(o)IM(j)·M(ok) (11) 
• Index of trade benefits 
The comprehensive index to incorporate export benefits and import 
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benefits at a given moment can be simply made up through combining (6) and (11), 
i.e., getting the geometric mean17 of I(E)i' and I(l)ik as follows; 
(12) 
(if I(E)i'= 0, I(T)ik= I(I)ik and if I(l)ik= 0, I(T)ik= I(E)ik) 
I(T)ik is the index of trade benefits of country j to country k, which signifies 
what level of benefits a certain country achieves from the trade with its specific 
trading partner country as compared with other partner countries. It only gives a 
proper measure of the possible improvement in the trade benefits of one of two 
trading countries to be gained from the increase of one dollar's worth of trade 
between them. Thus, this index signifies how much potential benefits a country 
can get from the increase of one dollar's worth of trade with its trading partner 
relatively to any other country. Therefore, for example, when country j gains the 
highest I(T)ik from the trade with country k, it neither necessarily means that 
country j is the biggest benefit gainer among all countries which country k has 
trade performances with, nor that country k is the biggest trade benefit giver to 
country j. The questions about which country can be the biggest benefit gainer 
17 The adding-up method is generally employed to get the absolute size. ITB indices focus on 
identifying the trade benefits in relative terms rather than gauging them in absolute terms. The 
average of two benefits does not suggest the absolute size of trade benefits .. but provides information 
on the change in their size. Thus, averaged ITB does not miss out on any information about the 
change in trade benefits. Furthermore, given that there is a high possibility that the adding-up 
method produces a fluctuating trend of results when used on a time-series base, it is pointed out that 
the averaged one is more compatible with the constitution of ITB indices. 
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from the trade with country k and which country can be the biggest trade benefit 
giver to country j will be addressed in the next chapter. 
If the outcome value of trade benefit index (I(T)ik)is equal to or bigger than 
one, country j is capable of acquiring quite advantageous gains from the trade 
with country k relatively to any other country. Meanwhile, if it is lower than one, 
country j's trade with country k is judged to produce unfavorable results as 
compared with any other country's trade with country k. As already mentioned in 
this paper, I(T)i• does not measure how much trade benefits have been distributed 
among trade-related countries in absolute terms. However, it captures the trade 
benefits allocated across countries in relative terms and provides valuable 
information that are useful in estimating the trade development potential of a 
certain country and predicting its future status in the international trade market. 
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III. Developing the Enhanced and Practical Usages of ITB Indices 
A. Basic ITB Indices 
All indices developed in the previous chapter, as tools to measure basic 
ITB, show the level of benefits that a certain country can expect to recognize from 
the increase of one dollar's worth of trade with its trading partner country. Thus, 
I(E)!)k or I(l)bik expresses the level of potential benefits that country j achieves in 
one dollar's worth of export to country k or one dollar's worth of import from 
country k relatively to any other country. I(T)J>ik indicates the ITB level that country 
j expects to get as the comprehensive gains from the trade of export and import 
with country k, which is defined as a geometric mean of I(E),ik and I(I)J>ik . The 
outcome values of these indices for a certain country turn out bigger, the higher its 
potential of getting the trade benefits. A country will try to increase its trade 
volume with its trading partner country that allows it to produce the high 
outcome values of indices. 
In addition, I(E)J>ik , I(I)J>ik and I(T)J>ik all function as a base for enhanced 
analyses of ITBs and are respectively interpreted exactly in the same way as in ( 6), 
(11) and (12). More detailed explanations on these indices do not need to be 
repeated in this section because all aspects of their characters have been already 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
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B. Principal ITB Indices 
Basic ITB indices are not indicative of the real size of ITB for a country at 
all. Even if a country's ITB is measured in a comparative method, its real size of 
ITB can be inferred in relative terms when the trade volume factor of its own or its 
trading partner's is taken into account. In other words, the product of basic ITB 
indices and trade volume factors of individual trading country suggests the level 
of basic ITBs adjusted from the point of view of a specific country and implies the 
real size of ITB for that country. Therefore, principal ITB indices can be used to 
recognize two kinds of positions of trading countries, i.e., the benefits giver 
country and the benefits gainer country. 
I(E)~k =l(E){ ·Wf' for all j and k E J, j * k, (13) 
where WF.ik is the fraction of exports of country j to country k out of total exports of 
country j at a given moment( I P,1k X /k I I P,1 X/ ). I(E)pik refers to the size of 
iel 
benefits that country j believes country k gives on a basis of one dollar's worth of 
export trade since they have been adjusted from the point of view of country j. 
Thus, basic ITB of country j has been differentiated by its size of export volume 
toward country k. Therefore, all of country j's trading partners can be ranked in 
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order of the size of adjusted benefits which country j gets from export trade with 
them. The biggest I(E)pik signifies that country k is the biggest export benefits giver 
to country j on a basis of one dollar's worth of export trade. 
There is a possibility that I(E)pik does not come up with its outcome value 
distinguishably differentiated across trading countries. To overcome this difficulty, 
the nominal export volume of country j to country k at a specific moment can be 
used instead of WEik, and the results show the size of benefits that country j is 
obtaining from export trade with country k. In some cases, the results can be 
bigger than country j's nominal export volume to country k, which turns up when 
country j has got the potential to enjoy more favorable export trade with country k 
than any other trading partner of country k. Furthermore, the product of basic 
export benefits index value (I(E)Jik) and country j's nominal export volume to 
country k can be judged to represent the absolute export benefits that country j 
gets from the exports to country k18• 
for all j and k E J, j ;< k, (14) 
where W,ki is the fraction of imports of country k from country j out of total 
18 The absolute export benefits also mean the level of mutual benefits taken by country j from the 
international trade market, but the problem is that the same level of mutual benefits can be 
differently appreciated by the other country with big economic capacity. Economic capacity here 
means what is closely related to the scale of producing export benefits for a certain country. 
Therefore, WEJk can be judged more objective than nominal export volume. 
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" k• k• " k k A imports of country kat a given moment(L.)': 'M;" I L..P, M; ). I(E)pik suggests the 
ie/ iel 
level of country j's export benefits that have been adjusted from the point of view 
of country k. Thus, basic lTB of country j has been differentiated by the size of 
import volume of country k from country j. All of country k's trading partners can 
be ranked in order of the size of adjusted benefits which each of them gets from 
export trade with country k, i.e., the size of the outcome value of I(E)pik. This 
country order gives a right answer to the question about which country can be the 
biggest export benefits gainer among all countries exporting to country k on a 
basis of one dollar's worth of export trade. 
I(I)~k = J(I)~k . W/ for all j and k E J, j * k, (15) 
where w,;k is the fraction of imports of country j from country k out of total 
imports of country j at a given moment<L:Nk M(k ILP, 1 M( ). I(I)piksuggests the 
ie/ ie/ 
level of country j's import benefits secured from country k exactly in the same way 
as I(E)pik does with respect to the level of country j's export benefits. I(I)pik also gives 
information necessary to choose the biggest import benefits giver to country j out 
of all its import trading countries on a basis of one dollar's worth of import trade. 
for all j and k E J, j * k, (16) 
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where WEki is the fraction of exports of country k to country j out of total exports of 
country k at a given moment <~):kj xtj (L_ P,k xt ). I(I)pik indicates the level of 
ie/ iel 
country j's import benefits that have been adjusted from the point of view of 
country k. All of country k's trading partners can be ranked in order of the size of 
adjusted benefits which each of them gets from import trade with country k, i.e., 
the size of the outcome value of I(I)pik. This country order gives a right answer to 
the question about which country can be the biggest import benefits gainer among 
all countries importing from country k on a basis of one dollar's worth of import 
trade. 
It is also possible to find out the biggest giver and gainer country of 
comprehensive trade benefits by computing the level of comprehensive trade 
benefits of export and import for each of trading countries. Thus, when (13) and 
(15) are combined, we can have a specific tool to allow us to identify the giver 
country of comprehensive trade benefits to country j in order of the size of benefits. 
for all j and k E J, j * k, (17) 
where I(T)pik also shows the level of comprehensive trade benefits that country j 
gets from one dollar's worth of trade with country k and is different from I(T)Iik 
in respect that it produces information necessary to place country k in order of the 
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size of trade benefits given to country j. 
By combining (14) and (16), we can also place all countries trading with 
country k in order of the size of comprehensive trade benefits gained by each of 
them. 
for all j and k E J, j * k, (18) 
where I(T)pik also suggests country j's comprehensive trade benefits from one 
dollar's worth of trade with country k, but the outcome value of I(T)pik helps 
identify what rank country j marks as a gainer of comprehensive trade benefits 
among all countries trading with country k. 
C. Complementary ITB Indices 
ITB indices discussed so far in this paper such as I(E)lik, I(I)lik, I(T)lik, 
I(E)pik, I(l)pik, I(T)pik, I(E)pik, I(I)pik and I(T)pik just focus on recognizing trade benefits 
distributed between two trading countries. In fact, they do not provide enough 
information to recognize the status of an individual country in the international 
trade market consisting of many countries. In order to diagnose the status of a 
specific country at a given moment, we need to know how much ITB that country 
can gain in a nationwide total from all trading partner countries at that time, 
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which is complementary to principal ITBs to comprehensively understand trade 
relationships between countries. Therefore, to collect all ITBs that a country 
acquires from one dollar's worth of trade with each of its partner countries is to do 
what appears to be necessary for the analysis of its potential in the international 
trade market. That is, principal ITBs can be simply utilized to compute 
complementary ITBs of a specific country and to address the further analysis of its 
trade potential. 
I(E)~ = L[I(E): ·I(E): t for all j and k E J, j * k, (19) 
kEJ 
where I(E)Ni suggests the complementary export benefits of country j, which does 
not mean the absolute level of export benefits for country j since it has been 
acquired by simply adding up all export benefits estimated relatively to other 
trading countries. In some cases, I(E)Ni can be on the increase despite the 
downturn trend of global exports including country j's export volume. This means 
country j maintains its market status more favorably in the face of contraction 
tendency in the international trade market than any other country does. 
I(E)pik is the export benefits index that measures the size of country j's 
benefits from the export to country k but that allows country j itself a pivotal role 
in deciding the size of export benefits. It is again noteworthy that I(E)pik is different 
from I(E)J>ik in their functions. I(E)J>ik points to the potential of country j's export 
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benefits from country k, meanwhile I(E)pik aims at sizing up the export benefits of 
country j practically from one dollar's worth of trade with country k. I(E)pik is also 
the export benefits index that expresses the size of country j's export benefits but 
that allows country k a pivotal role in deciding the size of benefits. Furthermore, 
combining two these indices will possibly help measure the size of export benefits 
for country j objectively given that the viewpoints of two trading partners on 
export benefits are amalgamated into one index. 
I (I)~ = :~:J(J): . iu): ]" for all j and k E J, j * k, (20) 
kEJ 
where I(I)Ni signifies the complementary import benefits of country j, which has 
similar concepts and functions, only in terms of import benefits, that I(E)Ni has in 
terms of export benefits for country j. I(I)pik and I(I)pik are also employed here by 
the same logic as I(E)pik and I(E)pik are adopted in (19) for obtaining more objective 
results. 
I(T)~ = [I(E)~ · 1(1)~ j" (21) 
(21) derives the complementary trade benefits of country j from 
combining (19) I(E)Ni and (20) I(l)Ni, and I(T)Ni provides implied information, which 
are useful in examining the future potential of country j in the international trade 
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market. I(T)Ni does not point to the absolute ITB level of country j, but just 
indicates the level of ITBs that country j can show when ITBs measured from one 
dollar's worth of trade with each of its trading partner countries are added up in 
all. In principle, this index is still based on how much benefits an individual 
country takes out of the worldwide-created trade benefits as compared with any 
other country. It is also true that the index value of a certain country can go up 
even if the world trade keeps sagging down. Therefore, adding up complementary 
ITBs of all countries does not mean the level of the worldwide trade benefits, 
which it seems can be measured by the trend of world trade volume. 
By the way, when basic ITBs for a specific pair of trading countries tum up 
very noticeably, it helps us differentiate trade benefits very clearly between one 
pair of trading countries and another pair. Nevertheless, when very outstanding 
basic ITBs from the trade with a few trade partners have affected complementary 
ITBs so powerfully, we cannot appropriately analyze the status of country j in the 
international trade market by comparing complementary ITBs with one another. 
Meanwhile, the trend in values of complementary ITB indices gives valuable 
information necessary to analyze the status of country j in the international market. 
Firstly, watching a monthly or annual trend of ITB index values gives us insightful 
information with regard to diagnosing the contemporary trade potential of a 
country. Secondly, comparing an index value of a . specific time spot with an 
average index value of the period including a specific time spot enables us to 
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foresee the short-term future changes of a specific country's status in the 
international trade market. 
There appear to be more ways to utilize ITB indices for the analysis of 
trade benefits. For example, comparing the three month or year moving averages 
of basic ITB index values on a serial basis makes it possible to take a glimpse at its 
future trade potential. Comparing the monthly or annual incremental values of 
basic or complementary ITBs of trading countries with one another can also help 
identify the future trend of their status in the market. 
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IV. Applications and Interpretations 
Three basic ITB, six principal ITB and three complementary ITB indices 
have been applied to internal trades among fifteen EU member countries and 
19,640 index values have been obtained. The analysis of outcome values proves 
that they effectively represent the trade gains distributed across countries. It is 
evidenced that neighboring and same language countries obtain substantial 
amounts of benefits from the trade between themselves because of close locations 
and identical culture. The outcome values also convincingly express that big 
countries with heavy trading are generally in a predominant position to attract 
favorable trading partner countries and share trade benefits with them. What's 
more, it has been confirmed that ITB indices have got relatively good power to 
diagnose the status of trading country in the market. 
A. Data 
Data used to get the outcome values of ITB indices are from External and 
intra-European Union trade (Monthly statistics) of Nov. 2003, Jan. 2004, Feb. 2004, 
Mar. 2004 and Jun. 2004 and External and intra-European Union trade-:Statistical 
yearbook (Data 1958-2002), which are posted on Europa's website. 
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EU member countries show not only relatively free internal trade 
relationships but also strong intraindustry trade. In addition, statistical authorities 
of EU keep churning out trade data in a good structured manner as well as on a 
periodical base. EU can be also judged as an exemplary economic bloc functioning 
quite agreeably to the multilateral trade agreements such as GATT and WTO. 
Therefore, EU trade data are regarded as the most appropriate to test the 
effectiveness of ITB indices. 
On January 1'', 1993, EU introduced the single market and abolished the 
customs formalities between member countries. To collect data and information on 
trades between member countries, they set up a new system, Intrastat, which 
makes the business level directly send monthly statistical declarations to the 
competent national authorities. Trade data that have been collected since January 
1", 1994 are only used here to maintain the consistency and comparability in the 
outcome values of ITB indices. 
The exports between EU member countries are recorded as the dispatches 
and the imports between member countries as the arrivals. The dispatches are the 
goods in free circulation within the EU which leave the statistical territory of a 
given member country to enter the statistical territory of another member country. 
The arrivals are the goods in free circulation within the EU which enter the 
statistical territory of a given member country. Accordingly, Intra-EU trade data do 
not include goods in transit or trade between EU member countries, and there are 
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some discrepancies between the dispatches and the arrivals. 
Trade goods are broken down by the sections and divisions of the UN 
Standard International Trade Classification(SITC Rev. 3 since 1988) by means of 
conversion tables drawn up on the basis of the Combined Nomenclature(CN), 
which is based on the international nomenclature of the Harmonized System(HS) 
and comprises around 10,000 eight-digit codes. The dispatches are quoted on a 
basis of the FOB value and the arrivals on a basis of the CIF value, which are 
always recorded in the total value of the goods. 
B. Results 
The indices of measuring the trade gains are divided into the three main 
groups such as basic ITB, principal ITB and complementary ITB indices as shown 
in figure 2. Basic ITB indices comprise of basic export benefits, basic import 
benefits and basic trade benefits indices. Principal ITB indices are made up of two 
principal export benefits (I(E)pik, I(E)pik), two principal import benefits (I(I)pik, I(I)pik) 
and two principal trade benefits (I(T)pik, I(T)pik) indices. Complementary ITB 
indices consist of complementary export benefits, complementary import benefits 
and complementary trade benefits indices. 
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<Figure 2> ITB Index Formation 
All ITB indices for fifteen EU member countries for the period of 1994 to 
2002 have been computed, and their values have been dished out in the form of 
matrix tables except complementary trade benefits index values. Therefore, all 
reference tables and broken line graphs in this paper have been prepared on the 
basis of 19,640 outcome values of ITB indices in 99 matrix tables and 1 normal 
table. 
In Table 1, partner countries are listed in order of values of basic trade 
benefits index (from high to low) on condition that their values are equal to or 
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bigger than one, i.e., I(T)ik;?: 1. For example, in 1994 Belgium could gain the highest 
Table 1. Countries with High Basic Trade Benefits 
1994 1998 
Belgium NL·, F. (2) NL•, F• (2) 
Denmark S, FIN, D (3) S, FIN, D (3) 
Germany A·, DK, NL, EL, I, A•, DK, NL, EL, I, 
s·, s (7) FIN, s·, F, S (9) 
Greece I (1) I (1) 
Spain P, F, I (3) P, F, I (3) 
France E, I, s•, P (4) E, s•, I, P, UK (5) 
Ireland UK• (1) UK.(1) 
Italy EL, E, F, A (4) EL, E, F, A, D (5) 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands s·, D (2) s·, D, UK, S (4) 
Austria D•, I (2) D·, I (2) 
Portugal E (1) E (1) 
Finland s·, DK, UK (3) s·, DK (2) 
Sweden FIN•, DK, UK (3) FIN•, DK, UK (3) 
United Kingdom IRL ·, FIN, S (3) IRL', S, FIN, NL 
(4) 
* Each country shares languages with astensked partner countries. 
*Luxembourg is added to Belgium until1998. 
2002 
L', NL', F•, IRL (4) 
S, FIN, D (3) 
A*, DK, NL, I, L*, 
EL, FIN, F, s·, S (10) 
I, E, A (3) 
P, F, I (3) 
E, L', I, P, s• (5) 
uK· (1) 
EL; A, E, F, D (5) 
s·, F·, D. (3) 
s·, D, UK (3) 
D·, I (2) 
E (1) 
s·, DK (2) 
FIN•, DK (2) 
IRL', NL, FIN, DK, 
s (5) 
* B Belgium, OK Denmark, D Germany, EL Greece, E Spain, F France, IRL Ireland, 
I Italy, L Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, A Austria, P Portugal, FIN Finland, 
S Sweden, UK United Kingdom 
basic trade benefits from the trade with the Netherlands (NL) and the second 
highest ones from the trade with France (F). The Netherlands and France are the 
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only partner countries with which Belgium could expect the value of basic trade 
benefits index of one and over from the trade for 1994. The number in parenthesis 
refers to the number of partner countries that fit the afore-mentioned condition on 
the size of index value. 
As shown in the table, neighboring and same language countries share 
high basic ITB values with each other. Big countries such as Germany, France, Italy 
and United Kingdom also gain high basic trade benefits outstandingly from the 
trade with more partner countries than any other country does. These results 
point to the fact that ITB indices effectively measure, in pursuance with the natural 
causations, the trade gains allocated across countries. 
C. Interpretations 
Neighboring countries 
The short distance between countries is conducive to the start and 
expansion of trade because they can get market information conveniently and 
inexpensively, save transportation costs and have much in common in terms of 
culture and social systems19• Their long historical experiences can also help trade 
relations go forward in a steadfast manner. It all assures us that neighboring 
19 Paul Krugman (1989) argued that geographical proximity does promote trade. Regional trading 
arrangements should be undertaken on the basis that it is natural for neighbors to indulge in trade 
with each other. David Hummels (2001) also found empirical evidence that import choices are made 
so as to minimize transportation costs. 
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countries can usually keep favorable trade relations with each other and get better 
ITBs from the trade between themselves than from the trade with any other 
country. The fact that close locations between trading countries cause for high ITBs 
to occur to each other is evidently confirmed by examining the countries listed in 
Table 1, of which more detailed ITB information are introduced in Table 2-1 
through 6-3. Particularly, the trade between Germany and Austria as well as that 
between Ireland and United Kingdom brings extremely high ITBs because of their 
geographical closeness and same languages. These highly active trade 
relationships between neighboring countries are well described empirically by the 
gravity equations as well. 
As summarized by Table 1, every neighboring country gains higher basic 
ITB from the trade with each other than from that with any other country. In other 
words, the closer the countries, the higher the potential for trade benefits between 
those countries. Belgium gets the first highest basic ITB from the trade with the 
Netherlands and the second highest with France until the splits of trade data 
between Belgium and Luxembourg in 1999. Since 1999 Belgium has looked upon 
Luxembourg as the most potential country in terms of gaining ITB from the trade 
(see the footnote of Table 2-3). Belgium is not only bordering these three countries 
but also sharing languages with them. 
However, in reality, big countries often replace small neighboring ones as 
more favorable trading partner countries, even though the trade with small ones 
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has higher potential for real ITBs on a basis of one dollar's worth than that with 
big ones. For example, Belgium gets higher real ITBs from the trade with the 
Netherlands than from that with Luxembourg20 despite its higher basic ITB with 
Luxembourg. The comparison between Belgian information for 2002 in Table 1 
and 2-3 and those in Table 3-3, 4-3, 5-3 and 6-3 confirms that Belgium gives more 
attention to the trade with the Netherlands to seek better ITB than to that with 
Luxembourg. 
Same language countries 
Countries in the first column of Table 1 share languages with asterisked 
trading partner countries. It is noteworthy that countries get the highest basic ITB 
from the trade with same language countries even among trading partner 
countries granting high basic ITB. The exceptional case is that France gets higher 
basic ITB from the trades with Spain, different language country, than from that 
with Belgium, same language country. 
Countries do not mostly give up same language ones even if they can seek 
better ITB from the trade with other big countries. For example, Germany and 
United Kingdom maintain very strong trade relationships with Austria and 
Ireland respectively and reap the highest basic and real ITB on a basis of one 
dollar's worth as exhibited in Table 1 through 6-3. On the contrary, Belgium has 
20 Luxembourg GDP stood at US$23.6bn at market prices of 2003 and Dutch GDP amounted to 
US$513.2bn. (Refer to Table 12) 
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not gained as much real ITB from the trade with Luxembourg as expected due to 
close location and language sharing. That is, their highest basic ITBs from each 
other have not been transformed into real ones because of their limited economic 
capacities. 
The trade with Luxembourg by neighboring countries has high benefits 
potential on a basis of one dollar's worth. However, its economic size is too small 
to have the capacity to the extent that all neighboring same language countries are 
attracted to have their potentials fully put into reality. ITB information on 
Luxembourg in Table 1, 5-3 and 6-3 also reflect its economic position with 
neighboring countries. 
Big countries with heavy trading21 
Big countries can exert powerful economic influences to their trading 
partner countries and get advantageous ITBs from the trade with as many 
countries as they want. They also provide greater ITBs to their trading partner 
countries than any other countries because they have sufficiently big economic 
capacity to engage other many countries in the pursuance of trade benefits. 
As Table 1 confirms, four big countries such as Germany, France, Italy and 
United Kingdom get high basic ITB from the trade with more trading partner 
21 When a country has more than five trading partner countries listed in 2002 column of Table t it is 
classified into a group of big countries for the sake of analytical convenience. Therefore~ Germany~ 
France~ Italy and United Kingdom are chosen as big countries. They are also four biggest 
countries in Europe in terms of the size of GDP. 
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countries than any other country. For instance, Germany and United Kingdom 
have kept increasing the number of trading partner countries with which they can 
get highly favorable ITB from the trade. Finally, in 2002 Germany could get high 
basic ITB (I(T)ik ~ 1) from the trade with ten countries out of fifteen EU member 
countries. 
As reported in Table 3-1 through 4-3, four big countries are providing high 
real ITB to each other as well. However, United Kingdom not only brings 
relatively small ITB index values from the trade with three other big countries, but 
also Germany, France and Italy all show smaller ITB index values from the trade 
with United Kingdom than from that among themselves. Particularly, United 
Kingdom and Italy obtain lower ITB from the trade with each other as compared 
with other big countries. Table 1 also points out that United Kingdom does not 
have high basic ITB from the trade with one of any other big countries. 
As shown in Table 1 and Table 2-3, in 2002 the trade with Ireland came out 
as another source of the most favorable ITB to Belgium and became more 
powerful potential provider of ITB than that with United Kingdom contrary to the 
past trade benefits record for the period of 1994 to 2001 22 • By examining 
information in Table 2-1 through 2-3, it is found that EU member countries 
recently got less basic ITB from the trade with United Kingdom than from that 
22 Relative sizes of basic trade benefits of Belgium"s trades with Ireland and United Kingdom for the 
period of1994 to 2002: 1994-IRL 4.40% LK 9.56%, 1995-IRL 4.33% UK 9.41%, 1996-IRL 5.20% UK 
9.66%, 1997-IRL 5.32% UK 9.71%, 1998-IRL 6.54% UK 9.42%, 1999-IRL 4.32% UK 6.77%, 2000-IRL 
4.96% UK 7.37%, 2001-IRL 5.22% UK 7.01% and 2002-IRL 8.83% UK 6.71 %. 
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with one of any other big countries. However, the size of real trade benefits that 
Ireland gives to Belgium on a basis of one dollar's worth of trade in 2002 is about a 
third of the corresponding trade benefits given by United Kingdom to Belgium 
(see IRL and UK columns of Table 3-3). Accordingly, Table 5-3 shows that Ireland 
ranks 7th in order of the size of trade benefits it gives to Belgium, i.e., the relative 
size of the basic trade benefits adjusted from the point of view of Belgium. In 
contrast, United Kingdom ranks 4th in order of the size of the corresponding trade 
benefits. Furthermore, the size of real trade benefits that Belgium takes out of the 
total benefits produced by all trading countries through the trade with Ireland, 
which is equivalent to the relative size of the basic trade benefits adjusted from the 
point of view of Ireland, is less than half of the size of the corresponding trade 
benefits adjusted from the point of view of United Kingdom (see the first row of 
Table 4-3). Nonetheless, in 2002 Belgium became the second biggest ITB gainer 
among all countries trading with Ireland and did the fifth biggest ITB gainer 
among all countries trading with United Kingdom as presented in the first row of 
Table 6-3. 
The fact that Ireland turns out to be a trading country giving less real ITB 
to Belgium than United Kingdom despite higher potential trade benefits is mainly 
associated with the national economic size that Ireland is far more small-scaled 
economy than United Kingdom23• Thus, it reflects that the effect of Belgium's trade 
23 EIU Country Report (April2004) for each country introduces that, at market prices of 2003, UK 
GDP stood at US$1,795bn and Irish GDP amounted to US$131.9bn. (Refer to Table 12) 
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volume for United Kingdom is big enough to exceed the effect of potential trade 
benefits enjoyed by Belgium from the trade with Ireland24 • On the other hand, the 
real trade benefits that Belgium gains from the trade with Ireland is also less than 
what it does from that with United Kingdom because there are the differences in 
the size of national economy and trade volume exactly as in the case of ITB giving 
countries. However, Belgium carne out to be higher ITB gainer among countries 
trading with Ireland than with United Kingdom in 2002 (see the first row of Table 
6-3). The reason is that Belgium can be a big player among countries trading with 
Ireland while it cannot be such a big player with United Kingdom. Thus, it means 
that United Kingdom has more big trading partners than Ireland does. 
Table 3-1 for principal trade benefits (I) for 1994 demonstrates in D and 
UK columns that the size of trade benefits given by Germany to Belgium, i.e., the 
size of trade benefits adjusted from the point of view of Belgium, is 2.3 times 
bigger than that by United Kingdom to Belgium. Table 4-1 for principal trade 
benefits (II) for 1994 presents in the first row that the size of trade benefits that 
Belgium can gain from the trade with Germany, i.e., the size of trade benefits 
adjusted from the point of view of Germany, is 1.5 times bigger than that gained 
by Belgium from United Kingdom. However, the level of basic trade benefits that 
Belgium can get from the trade with United Kingdom is slightly higher than what 
24 In 2002 Belgium's exports/dispatches to Ireland was Euro 1,756m and its imports/arrivals from 
Ireland Euro14,701m. Belgium's exports/dispatches to United Kingdom recorded Euro21,762m for 
the corresponding year and its imports/arrivals from United Kingdom Eurol5,324rn. (Source: 
External and intra-European Union trade- Statistical yearbook, Data 1958-2002 (2003 edition)) 
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it expects from the trade with Germany (see the first row of Table 2-1). In addition, 
in 1994 Germany incidentally had the same level of basic ITB from the trade with 
Denmark and the Netherlands as shown in the third row of Table 2-125• However, 
Table 3-1 (DK and NL columns) and Table 4-1 (D row) present that Germany get 
higher real ITB from the trade with the Netherlands than from that with Denmark. 
Table 5-1 (DK and NL rows) also confirms that Germany marks higher rank with 
the Netherlands than with Denmark. Moreover, through comparing basic ITB in 
Table 2-1 through 2-3 with principal ITB in Table 3-1 through 4-3, it has been 
confirmed that, when a country experiences almost the same level of basic ITB 
from the trade with several countries, the biggest economy out of them comes out 
as its trading partner with better capability of producing real ITB. 
The basic trade benefits are just focusing on signifying the potential for 
principal ITBs on a basis of one dollar's worth of trade. The principal trade 
benefits imply the size of real trade benefits that the trading countries give to their 
partner countries or gain from those ones on a basis of one dollar's worth of trade. 
Therefore, the comparison between basic ITB values and principal ITB values 
makes apparent that the potential is not necessarily put into concrete form as 
expected. The reality that German economic scale26 is much bigger than the UK 
one would help us understand why Belgium's principal ITBs from the trade with 
25 In NL row of Table 2-2, Netherlands' basic ITBs with Spain and Portugal tum out to be same ones. 
Nonetheless, their full values are different from each other. NL toE is 5.2093 and NL toP 5.2146. In A 
row and UK row of Table 2-3, A to F is 4.4740, A to UK 4.4704, UK to EL 5.6788 and UK to F 5.6823. 
26 German GDP amounted to US$2,698bn at market prices of 2003, which is bigger by 34.15% than 
UK GDP worth US$1,795bn. (Refer to Table 12) 
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both countries have turned out differently from the levels of basic ITBs. The size of 
Dutch economy, which is also bigger than that of Danish one27, must work as an 
effective factor to attract Germany as a closer trading partner to the Netherlands 
notwithstanding Germany's same basic ITB level with both Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
As demonstrated in Table 5-1 through 6-3, the Netherlands turns out to be 
the first biggest ITB giver28 to Belgium exactly the same rank as in the basic trade 
benefits and France is the second biggest ITB giver as well. Meanwhile, Belgium 
was the second biggest ITB gainer among countries trading with the Netherlands 
and the third biggest ITB gainer among countries trading with France in 1994. 
However, it became the fourth biggest ITB gainer among all countries trading with 
France in 1998 and 2002 despite its maintaining the second highest basic ITB value 
in 1998 and the third highest one in 2002 as referred to in Table 2-2 and 2-3. Given 
that Spain came out to be the second biggest ITB gainer with France in 1998 and 
2002 from the fourth biggest ITB gainer in 1994, it also introduces that a big 
country can easily take a prevailing position at securing favorable trade 
relationships''· 
27 Dutch GDP recorded US$513.2bn at market prices of 2003 and Danish GDP did US$235.4bn. (Refer 
to Table 12) 
28 The ratio of trade volume to GDP for the Netherlands is 0.84 on the basis of 2003 and that for 
Spain 0.45. It expresses that the Netherlands is more expansively engaged in the international trade 
market than Spain (Refer to Table 12). The fact that Dutch GDP is smaller than Spanish one makes 
clear how aggressively the Netherlands indulges in the international trade. The reason for the 
Netherlands to be placed in such a position is that the Netherlands is located in the mouth of the 
Rhine and performs its part as a trade hub country for neighboring countries. 
29 Spanish GDP turned out U$841bn at market price of 2003 and Belgian GDP did U$336bn. (Refer to 
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Taken altogether, it proves true that the ITB indices effectively measure 
the trade gains among neighboring, language sharing and big countries and 
clarify their trade benefits levels. 
Significance of complementary trade benefits 
Complementary ITB indices are useful in figuring the comprehensive 
standing of an individual country in the international trade market. However, the 
comparison of complementary ITB index values among trading countries does not 
bring about meaningful results as already stated in this paper"'. Denmark, Ireland, 
Finland and Sweden are exemplary countries to give good answers to the question 
about why the direct comparison of complementary ITB index values among 
trading countries is not an appropriate way to diagnose their places in the market. 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden get extremely high basic ITB index values from the 
trade with one another. Ireland and United Kingdom show very high basic ITB 
index values from the trade with each other, too. The trade between Spain and 
Portugal presents another case to produce noticeably high basic ITBs. The reason 
is closely associated with their unique trade relationships that they rely too much 
on each other in the international trade market as neighboring countries. 
Extraordinarily high basic ITBs for these countries31 are very likely to lead them to 
Table 12) 
30 Refer to the section of complementary ITB indices in Chapter III. 
31 In 1994 DK to FIN is 2.2541, DK to S 4.6306, FIN to DK 2.2704, S to DK 4.9520, FIN to S 5.4780, S to 
FIN 6.6449, IRE to UK 3.7495, UK to IRE 6.6764, E toP 5.2998, P toE 4.1081. In 1998 DK to FIN is 
2.7101, DK to S 5.2031, FIN to DK 3.0406, S to DK 4.9121, FIN to S 5.445, S to FIN 5.8795, IRE to UK 
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producing their high complementary ITB index values, which seem too much 
higher as compared with the bigger economies with powerful economic influences 
toward their trade partner countries (see Figure 3-1 to 3-3). 
Therefore, the trend of complementary ITB index values draws us to its 
forecast power. Thus, the increasing trend of complementary ITB index values for 
a country suggests that the country must be improving its status in the 
international trade market by getting more real ITBs from the trade with its 
trading partner countries. Now, the problem is what type of trend is more 
efficacious in foreseeing what will happen to the status of a country in the market. 
For convenience' sake, only two types of trends, i.e., the trend of yearly 
complementary trade benefits and trend of three year moving averages of basic or 
complementary trade benefits, are employed in this paper for the analysis of 
present and future status of a country in the market. 
The trend of yearly complementary trade benefits is used to identify the 
current status of a country in the market as well as to predict the short-term future 
complementary trade benefits just together with the trend of three year moving 
averages of complementary trade benefits. Through comparing Table 9 to 10 and 
3.5473, UK to IRE 6.1558, E toP 4.8668, P to E 3.8310. IN 2002 DK to FIN is 2.7298, DK to S 5.9260, FIN 
to DK 2.9399, S to DK 6.1652, FIN to S 5.7610, S to FIN 6.4940, IRE to UK 3.9312, UK to IRE 5.6385, E 
to P 5.3893 and P to E 4.5027. Some basic trade benefits index values are provided here, because Table 
2-1 to 2-3 show, just with relative sizes of basic trade benefits index values, that these countries get 
very high basic trade benefits index values from the trades with specific trade partners, but these 
tables do not give any information on how much their basic trade benefits index values affect their 
complementary trade benefits index values. Given that most trade relations between countries show 
basic trade benefits index values of less than one, these countries must record exceptionally high 
basic trade benefits index values. 
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Figure 3-1 to 3-3, fifteen EU member countries prove how the trend of yearly 
complementary trade benefits signifies the status of a country in the international 
trade market for the period of 1996 to 2002. Greece, France, the Netherlands and 
Austria have evidenced that the trends of their yearly complementary trade 
benefits nearly go together with those of their shares of the market, but 
Luxembourg has brought about the opposite development. Other countries' trends 
have largely represented their positions in the market agreeably with their trade 
market shares, but for some periods they conflict with the changes in their shares 
of EU trade market. For example, Germany does not keep the trend of its 
complementary trade benefits abreast with the change of its trade market share for 
2000 to 2001. Italy has the same kind of conflict for 1998 to 1999, and United 
Kingdom does for 2000 to 200132• As a result, the probability for the trend of 
complementary trade benefits to be identical with the trend of trade market share 
comes out to be 75.6%33. 
The trend of complementary trade benefits and that of trade market share 
are both based on trade volumes, but do not display the identical direction in the 
movement. The gap between them brings a meaningful message about how the 
32 Belgium and Denmark have conflicts between two comparing criteria for 1998 to 2000, Spain for 
1998 to 1999 and 2001 to 2002, Ireland for 1998 to 1999, Sweden for 1999 to 2001, Portugal for 2000 to 
2001, Finland for 1997 to 1998 and 2000 to 2002. 
33 The probability is a numerical mean of fifteen EU member countries' probabilities that the trend of 





complementary trade benefits of a country locates the status of that country in the 
market. The share of trade market is just information on how the market is simply 
divided by each of trading countries based on its trade volumes. The 
complementary trade benefits are different from such market shares because the 
appreciations of mutual trade benefits by trading partners in compliance with 
their own perspectives on economic priorities are embedded in these trade 
benefits. Therefore, they must suggest the comprehensive standing of a country in 
the international trade market. The fact that Luxembourg shows a decreasing 
trend in the complementary trade benefits (see Figure 3-2) in the face of the 
expansive, even minimal, trend in the trade market shares (see Table 9 and 10) 
gives an important momentum to the assessment of effectiveness of this broadly 
defined trade benefits index. 
Table 8 reports that, with regard to estimating the one year future 
complementary trade benefits for the period of 1997 to 2002, six EU member 
countries including four oldest EU member ones34 adopt the trend of three year 
moving averages of complementary trade benefits, two countries do the trend of 
yearly complementary trade benefits and six countries show indeterminate 
attitudes. The comparison between Figure 3-1 to 3-3 and Figure 4-1 to 4-3 helps 
34 Belgium, Germany. France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are the founding countries of 
ECSC established in 1952. The Netherlands shows an indeterminate attitude, and Luxembourg has 
been excluded because of the lack of its trade data concerned. Four other founding countrieS adopt 
the trend of three year moving averages of complementary trade benefits. Therefore, 
countries taking three year moving averages account for 42.9% out of fourteen EU member countries, 
ones taking yearly trends 14.2% and indeterminate ones 42.9%. 
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catch a glimpse of the procedure of making up Table 8. Meanwhile, in order to 
conduct a proper estimation for indeterminate countries, the trend of three year 
moving averages of basic trade benefits sits in for the previous estimation method 
based on two comparing criteria such as yearly complementary trade benefits and 
three year moving averages of them. 
Table 7 contains the number of partner countries with which a specific 
trading country experiences an increasing trend in three year moving averages of 
basic trade benefits. The change in the number of partner countries implies what 
will happen to the level of complementary trade benefits in one or two years. For 
example, to estimate the future trend of German complementary trade benefits, 
the changes in the number of partner countries for the range of I-II to III-IV in 
Table 7 have been analyzed for 2000, the range of II-III to IV-V for 2001 and the 
range of III-IV to V-VI for 2002. The more the number of trading partner countries, 
the higher does the trend of complementary trade benefits go up. Finally, the 
estimated trend for Germany and its yearly trend from Figure 3-1 tum out to be 
parallel to each other. Thus, the estimated results of Germany for the period of 
2000 to 2002 are assessed to be perfectly identical with the actual trend. The 
accuracy of estimations for four big countries during the same period is 83.3%, the 
one for ten other EU member countries 43.3% and the overall one for fourteen 
countries 54.8%. It seems advisable to take the estimation based on basic trade 
benefits for the future trend of complementary trade benefits of six indeterminate 
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countries given that its overall ac=acy 35 looks acceptable because United 
Kingdom also belongs to the indeterminate. The big difference in accuracy 
between four big countries and ten other ones also makes manifest that small 
countries have more constraints in transforming the potential things into reality 
than big countries do. 
In sum, the trend of three year moving averages of complementary trade 
benefits is useful for the estimation of its future trend for countries with long 
history of free trades among one another. The trend of three year moving averages 
of basic trade benefits seems effective to estimate the short-term future trend of 
complementary trade benefits. 
Newly explaining trade relationship based on ITB indices 
The terms of trade has taken the part of dividing the trade gains between 
countries up to now, but has not been free from mercantilist views. Besides, there 
is no proper way to gauge the trade gains for a certain country that experiences 
the deficits from the trade with its partner countries. Think about why the country 
experiencing trade deficits does not stop trading with its partner country. Because 
35 54.8% is also insignificant as a critical value when it should be decided whether the trend of three 
year moving averages of basic trade benefits reflects the future trend of complementary trade 
benefits appropriately or not. Small countries could take longer time for their potential to develop 
into a state of actuality becaUse of their more limited economic capacity compared with big 
countries". Therefore., if two or three year future trend of complementar)r trade benefits of srriall 
countries is estimated on the basis of the trend of three year moving averages of basic trade benefits, 
there seems to be a good possibility of getting more effective results. It has been also confirmed that 
the overall accuracy of longer-term estimations~ even if based on limited trade data~ turns out better. 
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there are worthy gains for that country, it continues to conduct the trade in the 
face of deficits. From the first rows of Table 11-1 to 11-3, it is noticed that Belgium 
demonstrates the increasing deficits from the trade with Ireland (2,128.2% from 
1994 to 2002) and the Netherlands (130.8% from 1994 to 2002). In fact, from 1994 to 
2002 Belgium increased the exports to Ireland by 264.3% and the imports from the 
same country by 1,283.0%. During the corresponding period in the trade with the 
Netherlands, Belgium expanded the exports by 70.6% and the imports by 79.7%36• 
The reason why Belgium increased trade volumes with those countries in spite of 
huge trade deficits can be identified through simply checking the relative sizes of 
principal ITBs in IRL and NL columns of Table 3-1 through 3-3 and in the first 
rows of Table 4-1 through 4-3. In practice, Belgium got substantial gains from the 
trade with the Netherlands and experienced a notable increase of benefits from the 
trade with Ireland. 
In 1994, on the one hand, United Kingdom was the only country that had 
the trade surplus with Ireland and thirteen other countries all recorded the trade 
deficits for the same year (see IRL column of Table 11-1). On the other hand, it 
turns out that every country got some benefits from the trade with Ireland even 
though United Kingdom alone had outstandingly secured the trade benefits (see 
IRL column of Table 3-1 and UK row of Table 4-1). Moreover, Germany marked 
36 Belgiwn's exports to Ireland in 1994 is ECU/Euro482m, ECU/Euro888m in 1998 and 
ECU/Euro1,756m in 2002. Its imports from Ireland in 1994 is ECU/Euro1,063m, ECU/Euro3,789m in 
1998 and ECU/Euro14,701m in 2002. Belgium's exports to Netherlands in 1994 is ECU/Euro15,427m, 
ECU/Euro20,688m in 1998 and ECU/Euro26,320m in 2002. Its imports from Netherlands in 1994 is 
ECU/Euro18,175m, ECU/Euro24,803m in 1998 and ECU/Euro32,663m in 2002. 
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the trade deficits worth ECU/Euro7,301m with the Netherlands in 1994, which 
made Germany a country experiencing the most deficits from the trade with the 
Netherlands. However, Germany turned out to be the first biggest benefits gainer 
from the trade with the Netherlands in 1994 (see D rows of Table 4-1 and 6-1). 
Therefore, the important point is that, when it is necessary to assess how beneficial 
a certain country's trade position is to itself and its partner country, the desirable 




International trade is taking place due to various types of causes, and it 
can also be initiated by new and unexpected motives or events in the future. 
Whatever reasons and causes there are for international trade, the only obvious 
thing is that it always accompanies worthy gains, where the broadly defined 
concept of trade gains must be adopted to describe the overall trade rewards 
whether quantifiable or not-quantifiable. Therefore, if there are no worthy gains, 
there should be no trade. If there is an increase of worthy gains, there must be an 
expansion in trade volumes and vice versa. The ITB indices are constituted in 
compliance with this simple principle. 
It is also quite natural that neighboring countries and those using same 
languages are keeping more favorable trade relationships with each other than 
with any other partner countries. Furthermore, big neighboring countries are in a 
predominant position to attract favorable trading partner countries and share 
trade benefits with them. The application of ITB indices to the internal trade 
activities among fifteen EU member countries proves that ITB indices are effective 
in terms of measuring power by showing the outcome values in line with the 
natural causations. Thus, the international trade benefits can be measured 
quantitatively and in a different dimension, i.e., free from mercantilist views. 
The terms of trade just corresponds to the relative price ratio set at the 
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equilibrium point and cannot give any explanations to the new types of 
intemational trade carried out irrespective of the price differentials. Therefore, the 
instability of equilibrium point and the intraindustry trade invalidate the role of 
the terms of trade as a divider of trade gains and as a predictor of the direction of 
trade. ITB indices come up with appropriate solutions to overcome the failures of 
the terms of trade. Moreover, when ITB indices are incorporated with the gravity 
equations, it can expectedly lead to the more dynamic analysis of intemational 
trade. 
To find out who gives how much gains to whom and who gets how much 
gains from whom is very important to clearly figure the positions and attitudes of 
trading partners and to foresee how the trade will move on. The primary purpose 
of ITB indices developed in this paper is to settle those problems efficiently and 




There can be several rare types of trade relationships, which are not 
appropriate to apply a comparative approach to the analysis of their trade benefits. 
Firstly, suppose that country A only has a trade relationship with country B and is 
not interested in opening up a new trade relationship with any other country. 
Country A cannot by assumption maintain and operate its national economy 
without trading with country B. It is also assumed that country B has a diversified 
trade relationship with a number of countries and does not feel pressured to trade 
with country A. In this case, the indices of ITB cannot be utilized in measuring 
trade benefits allocated between two countries because of the limit in the number 
of country A's trading counterparts. By the way, country A clearly gets unlimited 
benefits from the trade with country B because they cannot procure from other 
countries the goods urgently needed for their economy. On the other hand, 
country B can exercise a magnificent bargaining power on country A, completely 
isolated from international trade market, and get unlimited trade benefits if they 
want. It is definitely true that country B must be enjoying a monopolistic status in 
country A's market. 
Secondly, another extreme case is that two countries are trading only with 
each other exactly as in the classical two-country trade model. This extreme case 
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cannot be assessed by the indices of ITB, either. When these two countries have 
completely specialized in the production of export goods and have to trade with 
each other for domestic consumptions, they must be exerting monopolistic powers 
to each other for their export goods because neither of these two countries 
domestically produces import-substituting goods any more. This implies that both 
countries are getting rather high benefits through international trade between 
themselves. Furthermore, it is not easy for them to go back to the same diversified 
production patterns as they took before their complete specialization in the 
production of export goods even though they want to restart producing import-
substituting goods. When a certain country has completely specialized in the 
production of export goods, and all the production factors are used to produce 
those goods, it creates additional costs to divert some of production factors into 
the production of import-substituting goods. Eventually, the marginal costs of 
unproduced goods (import goods) have become higher than their market prices37, 
and both countries will avoid producing import-substituting goods as they can 
buy those goods at a reasonable market price. 
If two countries in extreme cases keep taking diversified production 
patterns instead of completely specialized production ones, we can measure the 
size of each country's trade benefits by respectively comparing the trade volume of 
related goods with the domestic consumption volume of those goods. When one 
37 See Miltiades Chacholiades, 1978, "International Trade Theory and Policy", McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Ch. 9, pp. 250-251. 
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country exports the goods to the other country, the difference between the 
domestic consumption of the latter country and the exports by the former country 
to the latter country should be supplied by the domestic production sector, i.e., 
import-substituting production sector. This domestic supply of the latter country 
could be on a competitive footing with the export by the former country. Therefore, 
I(T) = EX/{EX + DS), where I(T) is the index of ITB for the former country, EX 
indicates the export by the former country, and DS shows the domestic supply of 
the latter country. The expected values of I(T) necessarily belongs to the range of 0 
~ I(T) ~ 1. If I(T) <: 1/2, the former country can be judged as reaping fairly good 
trade benefits. If I(T) = 1, it ensures that the former country can exercise a full 
monopolistic power to the latter country for the goods concerned. 
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Table 2 - 1. Relative Size of Basic Trade Benefits 
-1994 (% ) 
~ Partner Countries 
Reoorter B OK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 4.33 9.51 4.36 5.25 14.23 4.40 5.90 20.98 3.12 5.35 4.91 8.10 9.56 
OK 2.59 8.03 4.64 2.57 3.05 3.31 3.94 5.20 3.00 5.21 17.11 35.15 6.20 
D 6.29 8.21 7.59 4.56 5.93 2.99 7.21 8.21 27.83 4.52 5.77 6.11 4.78 
EL 3.93 7.67 10.20 7.65 5.93 4.29 23.41 6.25 5.84 3.68 7.59 5.96 7.62 
E 3.47 3.28 5.16 6.08 11 .73 3.33 9.07 3.87 2.86 37.64 3.87 2.98 6.68 
F 12.46 4.70 7.83 5.48 16.81 5.31 12.50 5.68 3.02 9.81 3.71 3.99 8.70 
IRL 3.72 5.66 5.22 3.48 4.00 4.76 4.06 6.00 2.36 3.26 5.55 7.72 44.21 
I 4.73 5.07 8.78 22.55 10.53 10.30 3.71 4.65 9.50 5.60 4.13 4.05 6.41 
L 
NL 18.01 7.63 11.72 6.16 4.80 6.23 5.71 5.25 3.97 5.02 7.72 7.92 9.85 
A 3.98 6.28 24.65 8.48 5.35 4.49 2.88 14.28 4.69 5.30 7.19 8.31 4.10 p 3.82 6.78 6.12 3.03 36.30 8.58 3.29 5.63 4.80 3.09 5.41 5.57 7.58 
FIN 2.59 15.79 5.22 5.18 3.41 2.71 3.32 3.49 4.11 3.58 4.59 38.09 7.94 
s 3.23 26.93 4.22 3.31 2.30 2.33 3.05 2.87 3.29 3.02 3.15 36.14 6.16 
UK 4.54 5.71 4.16 4.44 4.99 5.20 39.08 4.27 5.75 1. 77 5.16 7.61 7.33 
' * Basrc trade benefrts srgnrfy the level of trade benefrts that the reporter country expects from one dollar s worth of trades wrth rts partners. 
Therefore, it suggests that, in reality, the trading countries do not necessarily enjoy the same level of corresponding benefits as the outcome 
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Table 2- 2. Relative Size of Basic Trade Benefits 
-1998 (%) 
~ Partner Countries 
Reoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 4.41 9.53 4.79 4.98 13.38 6.54 6.13 19.21 3.52 5.02 5.33 7.73 9.42 
DK 2.83 7.59 5.10 2.59 3.07 3.53 4.05 5.00 3.13 3.66 18.24 35.02 6.18 
D 6.35 8.40 7.49 4.89 6.28 3.42 7.30 8.17 25.57 5.31 6.12 5.47 5.24 
EL 4.10 7.76 9.96 7.34 6.05 3.51 22.24 6.28 5.71 3.52 7.70 7.62 8.21 
E 3.57 3.46 5.48 5.64 12.05 3.51 9.74 3.83 3.10 36.33 3.48 3.58 6.23 
F 12.31 4.66 8.09 6.02 16.46 4.88 12.20 5.97 3.44 9.07 4.06 4.36 8.47 
IRL 5.43 6.64 6.14 2.81 4.24 5.71 3.98 6.65 1.84 2.77 6.31 6.36 41.14 
I 4.72 4.91 8.40 22.67 1 0.1.6 10.07 3.36 4.56 10.03 5.43 4.86 4.41 6.42 
L 
NL 16.99 7.42 11 . 41 5.90 5.21 6.27 5.59 5.31 4.25 5.21 7.74 9.17 9.52 
A 4.05 5.93 28.36 6.79 4.65 4.76 2.90 14.41 5.45 3.26 8.49 6.37 4.60 p 4.84 5.26 7.34 3.79 35.76 8.42 2.64 6.24 4.85 2.69 5.03 5.37 7. 76 
FIN 2.96 19.23 5.06 5.43 2.79 2.74 3.10 3.72 4.84 3.87 3.17 36.96 6.13 
s 3.67 27.24 4.33 3.55 2.57 2.65 3.67 2.74 4.88 3.22 2.84 32.61 6.03 
UK 5.21 5.66 4.54 4.81 5.31 5.57 35.52 4.97 6.70 2.20 5.39 6.77 7.35 
' * Bas1c trade benefits s1gn1fy the level of trade benefits that the reporter country expects from one dollars worth of trades w1th 1ts partners. 
Therefore, it suggests that, in reality, the trading countries do not necessarily enjoy the same level corresponding benefits as the outcome 
values of basic trade benefits indicate. Luxembourg is added to Belgium until 1998. (~ :Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 2- 3. Relative Size of Basic Trade Benefits 
-2002 ( % ) 
..... Partner Countries 
R<morter B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 2.67 7.27 3.86 3.71 9.82 8.83 4.90 21.84 14.71 2.39 4.10 3.57 5.62 6.71 
DK 2.15 7.05 5.08 2.71 3.00 3.96 3.35 2.67 4.50 2.79 2.90 16.94 36.77 6.13 
D 5.59 8.31 6.19 4.62 5.99 2.30 6.93 6.86 7.89 23.73 4.96 6.15 5.46 5.03 
EL 3.46 5.99 6.86 8.75 6.08 2.31 22.47 1.44 7.76 8.42 4.29 7.70 6.63 7.83 
E 2.87 3.30 5.08 6.88 11 .62 2.96 9.30 2.18 3.46 3.11 37.12 3.19 3.14 5.80 
F 9.43 4.01 7.28 5.75 14.04 3.80 11 .05 11.44 5.12 3.38 9.53 3.72 4.31 7.14 
IRL 8.69 6.40 4.30 3.31 3.69 4.37 4.14 1 .53 5.53 1.90 2.69 5.00 4.74 43.70 
I 4.61 4.16 7.76 20.65 10.23 9.77 3.49 4.38 4.46 10.26 5.52 4.70 4.41 5.61 
L 27.74 2.67 13.71 2.02 4.48 15.50 1.88 5.01 6.28 4.78 2.92 3.00 3.73 6.28 
NL 16.13 6.88 10.86 6.36 4.74 5.82 5.23 5.27 4.95 3.86 4.65 8.24 7.75 9.27 
A 3.54 4.93 26.29 6.96 4.54 4.47 2.21 14.53 5.21 5.39 3.16 7.75 6.54 4.47 
p 4.14 4.11 7.01 4.33 40.33 7.84 2.22 6.39 2.71 4.21 2.56 3.40 4.54 6.21 
FIN 2.90 18.39 5.46 5.61 2.65 2.75 2.84 3.65 1 .86 5.47 3.82 2.69 36.03 5.87 
s 3.42 31 .19 4.15 3.18 2.19 2.60 2.37 2.77 1.09 4.33 2.64 2.17 32.85 5.04 
UK 5.29 6.41 4.67 5.68 5.73 5.68 32.68 4.69 3.14 6.68 2.44 4.16 6.44 6.32 
' * Bas1c trade benefits s1gn1fy the level of trade benefits that the reporter country expects from one dollars worth of trades w1th 1ts partners. 
Therefore, it suggests that, in reality, the trading countries do not necessarily enjoy the same level corresponding benefits as the outcome 
values of basic trade benefits indicate. Since the splits of trade data between Belgium and Lux em bourg in 1999, the sizes of Belgium's 
basic trade benefits with Luxembourg for 1999, 2000 and 2001 are 28.38%,22.22% and 21.10% respectively. 
(-> :Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain P Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland S Sweden 
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Table 3- 1. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits {I) 
- 1994 ( 'Y< ) 0 
.j. Reporter Countries 
Partner B OK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 0.36 21.06 0.13 1.26 27.22 0.31 3.02 34.73 0.27 0.38 0.28 1.73 
OK 0.95 25.68 0.24 0.51 2.30 0.29 2.27 4.12 0.41 0.60 5.58 50.31 
D 9.03 3.22 1.02 2.79 14.31 0.45 11 .84 15.42 30.19 0.80 1 .11 2.78 
EL 1 .36 1 .17 26.38 2.81 5.44 0.31 49.44 3.75 0.98 0.19 0.72 1.01 
E 1.82 0.37 11.54 0.45 34.17 0.32 12.41 2.48 0.40 27.00 0.32 0.43 
F 18.42 0.69 23.18 0.34 16.98 0.74 19.28 4.81 0.43 1 .92 0.27 0.73 
IRL 0.55 0.29 3.14 0.04 0.35 1.58 0.69 1 .56 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.77 
I 3.64 0.93 34.08 5.46 9.03 27.86 0.43 3.84 4.46 0.78 0.39 0.87 
L 
NL 30.20 1.37 39.35 0.33 1.35 7.25 0.66 3.07 0.55 0.42 0.89 2.11 
A 0.79 0.44 81.67 0.29 0.77 1 .76 0.08 10.26 1.19 0.22 0.36 1 .1 0 
p 1.35 0.96 9.99 0.07 61.95 11 .86 0.19 3.04 2.33 0.29 0.38 0.93 
FIN 0.94 7.66 10.93 0.31 0.88 1.80 0.29 1. 77 2.57 0.58 0.46 60.86 
s 2.35 32.00 11 .49 0.20 0.65 2.17 0.40 1.93 2.66 0.67 0.35 34.56 
UK 5.40 1 .87 13.26 0.42 3.50 12.19 41.54 4.99 9.17 0.29 1.08 2.02 4.27 
' • Th1s table shows the relative s1ze of trade benefits that the partner country believes 1t gets from one dollars worth of trades w1th 
the reporter country. It means that the reporter country gives the corresponding trade benefits to the partner country. 
Luxembourg is added to Belgium until 1998. (-!. : Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
















Table 3- 2. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits (I) 
-1998 ( %) 
J. Reporter Countries 
Partner B OK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 0.38 21 .58 0.14 1 .51 25.60 0.91 3.49 33.06 0.35 0.42 0.40 1.87 
OK 1.04 21.23 0.25 0.62 2.22 0.41 2.32 3.86 0.42 0.34 6.77 53.62 
D 8.54 3.18 0.86 3.84 15.20 0.71 11.92 15.80 26.33 1.22 1.33 2.48 
EL 1.48 1.20 25.00 3.35 5.80 0.28 46.53 4.14 0.94 0.22 0.85 1 .92 
E 1.76 0.38 11.78 0.32 33.48 0.43 13.51 2.42 0.44 27.17 0.28 0.66 
F 16.70 0.63 22.62 0.34 19.90 0.77 18.02 5.34 0.52 1 .89 0.36 0.92 
IRL 1.17 0.40 4.33 0.02 0.51 2.36 0.69 2.11 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.61 
I 3.57 0.88 31.00 5.02 10.94 27.33 0.47 4.01 4.95 0.91 0.63 1 .18 
L 
NL 27.43 1.34 37.94 0.29 2.12 7.74 0.87 3.37 0.66 0.58 1.05 3.32 
A 0.64 0.31 84.29 0.13 0.60 1 .61 0.08 8.64 1.39 0.08 0.46 0.59 
p 1. 76 0.47 11 .63 0.08 63.41 9.58 0.13 3.18 2.11 0.18 0.32 0.81 
FIN 1.15 10.61 9.67 0.29 0.73 1.79 0.32 1 .99 3.69 0.65 0.26 61 .95 
s 2.83 30.83 11.34 0.20 0.99 2.71 0.72 1.74 5.95 0.72 0.33 31 .05 
UK 5.74 1 .53 12.84 0.38 4.24 11.79 39.56 5.75 10.98 0.36 1 .19 1.55 4.11 
' * Th1s table shows the relat1ve s1ze of trade benef1ts that the partner country believes 1t gets from one dollars worth of trades w1th 
the reporter country. It means that the reporter country gives the corresponding trade benefits to the partner country. 
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Table 3- 3. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits (I) 
-2002 ( % ) 
,j. Reporter Countries 
Partner B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 0.25 20.97 0.17 1.54 22.62 3.33 3.66 3.67 32.02 0.29 0.49 0.31 1 .56 
DK 0.69 19.23 0.28 0.78 2.18 0.72 1.64 0.07 3.27 0.37 0.23 6.25 56.92 
D 7.99 3.49 0.71 4.07 14.64 0.48 11.42 0.72 15.84 26.61 1 .20 1.47 2.48 
EL 1.63 1.07 17.03 6.00 6.03 0.21 48.90 0.02 6.21 1.39 0.37 0.96 1 .51 
E 1.33 0.38 10.85 0.54 32.41 0.43 12.89 0.05 2.10 0.50 30.69 0.25 0.51 
F 13.98 0.62 23.14 0.42 20.40 0.79 18.35 1.25 4.98 0.66 2.65 0.38 1.05 
IRL 2.89 0.36 1.96 0.03 0.39 1.25 0.67 0.00 1.33 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.29 
I 3.96 0.71 28.43 4.83 12.96 26.91 0.71 0.98 4.06 5.86 1.03 0.63 1 .17 
L 42.63 0.09 27.96 0.02 0.81 21.91 0.06 1.39 1 .01 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.73 
NL 28.87 1 .30 36.81 0.37 2.07 7.00 1.08 3.49 0.20 0.62 0.51 1.30 2.41 
A 0.61 0.26 82.63 0.17 0.72 1.59 0.07 9.80 0.08 1.55 0.09 0.45 0.67 
p 1 .18 0.25 8.96 0.10 74.12 6.87 0.11 2.76 0.03 1 .34 0.15 0.12 0.46 
FIN 1 .21 10.18 11.27 0.33 0.72 1.77 0.36 1 .88 0.03 4.67 0.67 0.19 60.14 
s 2.52 39.31 9.82 0.16 0.75 2.39 0.38 1 .64 0.02 4.42 0.49 0.19 30.63 
UK 6.02 1.90 12.72 0.51 5.03 11.24 42.30 4.73 0.14 10.20 0.44 0.71 1.35 2.72 
' • This table shows the relat1ve s1ze of trade benefits that the partner country believes 1t gets from one dollars worth of trades w1th 
the reporter country. It means that the reporter country gives the corresponding trade benefits to the partner country. (-!- : Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 

















Table 4- 1. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits (II) 
-1994 (%) 
.... Partner Countries 
Reoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 0.88 9.91 1 .16 1 .75 17.37 0.38 3.06 28.14 0.31 1.28 0.88 2.77 6.75 
DK 0.31 3.59 0.85 0.28 0.58 0.15 0.77 1 . 1 7 0.16 0.78 6.44 30.71 1.90 
D 25.59 29.30 29.94 12.93 28.93 2.06 37.76 43.94 92.05 9.97 11.93 15.58 18.08 
EL 0.12 0.25 1.06 0.38 0.32 0.03 4.05 0.28 0.10 0.06 0.23 0.18 0.46 
E 1 . 11 0.53 3.35 2.49 14.27 0.24 7.68 1.27 0.30 63.61 0.73 0.58 4.06 
F 28.30 2.56 17.71 4.95 40.21 1 .31 29.51 6.82 0.77 11.86 1.58 2.25 15.68 
IRL 0.24 0.28 0.58 0.20 0.25 0.54 0.32 0.56 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.48 28.23 
I 2.98 2.18 14.03 48.69 12.27 17.57 0.48 2.92 4.57 2.74 1 .39 1 .71 5.97 
L 
NL 30.90 3.81 18.04 3.19 2.20 4.92 0.96 3.30 0.57 1.86 2.68 3.39 10.52 
A 0.29 0.44 17.40 0.98 0.43 0.47 0.04 4.06 0.47 0.30 0.52 0.78 0.35 
p 0.31 0.54 0.97 0.15 20.52 1.72 0.05 0.66 0.41 0.08 0.34 0.36 1 . 1 7 
FIN 0.24 4.94 1.25 0.65 0.31 0.28 0.10 0.38 0.64 0.15 0.38 29.24 2.14 
s 1.39 47.24 3.06 0.94 0.47 0.77 0.38 0.91 1 .54 0.44 0.78 62.49 4.68 
UK 8.23 7.05 9.04 5.83 8.01 12.25 93.80 7.51 11.82 0.46 6.24 10.56 11 .97 
* Th1s table shows the relat1ve s1ze of trade benef1ts that each reporter country takes out of the total trade benefits ga1ned from all the 
trades by all reporter countries with one specific partner country, i.e., the relative size of reporter country's basic trade benefits adjusted 
from the point of view of the partner country. The corresponding trade benefits level also means what the reporter country gains from 
one dollar's worth of trades with the partner country. Luxembourg is added to Belgium until 1998. (--> :Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 4- 2. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits (II) 
-1998 ( % ) 
..... Partner Countries 
Reoorte B OK 0 EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 0.98 9.29 1.32 1 .67 15.40 0.95 3.19 25.26 0.35 1.34 1 .20 2.95 6.88 
OK 0.35 3.20 0.93 0.30 0.54 0.22 0.76 1 .12 0.16 0.37 8.95 30.14 1. 70 
0 24.89 26.98 27.37 13.60 28.22 3.08 35.09 41 .90 90.97 11 .70 12.83 13.43 18.63 
EL 0.12 0.24 0.86 0.30 0.31 0.02 3.52 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.22 0.44 
E 1.37 0.70 4.31 2.74 17.12 0.40 9.98 1.76 0.35 65.57 0.73 0.95 4.56 
F 26.98 2.56 17.75 5.56 39.16 1.70 28.50 7.52 0.92 9.49 1.92 2.76 14.91 
IRL 0.62 0.42 0.83 0.15 0.32 0.68 0.34 0.75 0.03 0.09 0.34 0.55 27.11 
I 3.30 2.29 13.32 48.90 12.92 16.93 0.53 3.17 5.10 2.73 2.02 1.86 6.61 
L 
NL 30.46 3.96 18.19 3.40 2.56 5.42 1 .36 3.66 0.78 1.90 3.88 6.30 11.79 
A 0.31 0.39 17.27 0.70 0.37 0.49 0.04 4.00 0.57 0.13 0.67 0.58 0.41 
p 0.41 0.33 1.35 0.19 20.26 1.65 0.04 0.80 0.49 0.05 0.26 0.34 1.26 
FIN 0.33 7.08 1.30 0.76 0.25 0.33 0.14 0.53 0.88 0.22 0.24 28.48 1.52 
s 1.52 47.20 2.64 1 .28 0.61 0.89 0.44 0.94 2.68 0.36 0.59 59.02 4.18 
UK 9.33 6.87 9.68 6.70 7.69 12.01 91 .09 8.69 13.65 0.63 5.78 7.92 11.45 
* Th1s table shows the relative s1ze of trade benefitS that each reporter country takes out of the total trade benefits ga1ned from all the 
trades by all reporter countries with one specific partner country, i.e., the relative size of reporter country's basic trade benefits adjusted 
from the point of view of the partner country. The corresponding trade benefits level also means what the reporter country gains from 
one dollar's worth of trades with the partner country. Luxembourg is added to Belgium until1998. (->:Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
0 Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 4- 3. Relative Size of Principal Trade Benefits (II) 
2002 ( ')'< ) - 0 
..... Partner Countries 
Renorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
8 0.60 9.26 t .76 1.44 13.88 2.90 3.56 17.17 26.50 0.33 1 .1 0 1 .03 2.65 6.43 
DK 0.25 3.37 1 .13 0.34 0.57 0.28 0.62 0.54 1.09 0.15 0.22 8.35 37.97 1 .95 
D 23.79 24.18 22.73 12.64 27.78 1 .58 32.87 35.21 41.18 89.74 9.08 13.52 12.68 17.60 
EL 0.15 0.23 0.70 0.59 0.42 0.02 4.50 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.09 0.32 0.22 0.59 
E 1.33 0.77 4.60 5.25 18.54 0.35 11.48 2.91 1. 75 0.45 73.63 0.70 0.79 4.92 
F 22.69 2.20 17.17 5.97 35.58 1 .16 27.91 31 .22 6.72 1 .02 8.47 1.80 2.76 12.86 
IRL 2.26 0.57 0.57 0.20 0.32 0.62 0.51 0.21 0.82 0.03 0.09 0.31 0.35 33.93 
I 3.59 1.54 12.35 47.06 12.90 16.76 0.61 0.23 3.22 5.91 2.42 1.83 1 .81 5.16 
L 2.77 0.03 0.80 0.01 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.15 
NL 31.28 3.22 17.96 4.54 2.23 4.98 1 .15 3.76 3.81 0.80 1 .28 4.52 4.68 11 .00 
A 0.28 0.31 17.72 0.75 0.41 0.57 0.04 4.74 1 .84 0.59 0.12 0.64 0.53 0.45 
p 0.42 0.20 1.33 0.32 24.78 1 .84 0.04 0.89 0.41 0.41 0.05 0.15 0.23 0.79 
FIN 0.31 6.00 1.48 0.86 0.22 0.34 0.11 0.53 0.29 1 .1 0 0.22 0.12 27.31 1 .31 
s 1.43 52.79 2.62 1 .1 0 0.47 0.95 0.22 0.98 0.41 2.12 0.33 0.32 59.91 2.86 
UK 9.45 7.35 10.06 8.33 8.02 11 .75 91 .53 7.51 5.44 13.88 0.77 3.05 6.89 8.00 
* Th1s table shows the relat1ve s1ze of trade benefits that each reporter country takes out of the total trade benefits ga1ned from all the 
trades by all reporter countries with one specific partner country, i.e., the relative size of reporter country's basic trade benefits adjusted 
from the point of view of the partner country. The corresponding trade benefits level also means what the reporter country gains from 
one dollar's worth of trades with the partner country. (--> : Table reading direction) 
8 Belgium Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 5 - 1 . Country Ranks in Giving Trade Benefits 
-1994 
--> Partner Countries 
Reoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 8 5 7 7 3 7 8 2 7 7 8 6 5 
DK 9 7 8 11 10 9 9 7 9 8 4 2 10 
D 3 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 
EL 13 13 11 8 12 13 5 13 11 13 12 13 12 
E 7 10 8 6 4 8 3 8 8 1 9 10 8 
F 2 6 3 4 1 3 2 4 3 2 6 7 3 
IRL 10 12 13 12 12 8 12 10 13 12 13 11 1 
I 5 7 4 1 3 2 6 5 2 5 7 8 6 
L 
NL 1 5 2 5 6 6 4 7 4 6 5 5 4 
A 12 11 1 10 10 11 11 6 11 11 10 9 13 
p 8 9 12 13 2 7 12 11 12 12 11 12 11 
FIN 11 4 10 11 12 13 10 13 9 10 10 1 9 
s 6 1 9 9 9 9 5 10 6 5 9 1 7 
UK 4 3 6 3 5 5 1 4 3 6 4 2 4 
* Th1s table shows the ranks that the reporter country marks 1n terms of the level of 1ts contnbut1ons of trade benefits to the partner country. 
The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (1). Luxembourg is added to Belgium until1998. 
(--> : Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
81 
Table 5-2. Country Ranks in Giving Trade Benefits 
-1998 
~ Partner Countries 
Reoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 8 6 8 7 4 5 8 2 6 7 8 6 6 
DK 11 8 9 11 10 9 11 8 10 9 2 2 10 
D 3 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 
EL 13 13 12 12 13 13 5 13 11 13 12 13 12 
E 7 9 7 6 2 8 3 7 7 1 9 9 7 
F 2 7 3 4 1 3 2 4 3 3 7 7 3 
IRL 8 11 13 12 10 9 13 10 12 12 ll ll 1 
I 5 6 4 1 3 3 6 5 2 5 6 8 5 
L 
NL 1 5 2 5 6 6 4 7 4 6 5 5 4 
A 12 10 1 10 9 11 12 6 11 11 10 10 13 
p 9 12 11 13 2 7 11 10 12 12 13 12 11 
FIN 10 4 10 11 13 12 10 12 9 9 10 1 9 
s 6 1 9 7 8 8 7 9 6 8 8 1 8 
UK 4 3 5 3 5 5 1 4 3 5 4 4 4 
* Thrs table shows the ranks that the reporter country marks rn terms of the level of rts contrrbutrons of trade benefrts to the partner country. 
The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (1). Luxembourg is added to Belgium until 1998. 
(~ : Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
DK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 5 - 3. Country Ranks in Giving Trade Benefits 
- 2002 
..... Partner Countries 
Reporte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 10 6 7 7 4 2 8 1 2 8 7 8 6 5 
DK 13 8 10 12 12 8 12 11 8 10 9 3 1 9 
D 3 2 2 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 
EL 14 12 13 8 13 13 6 13 12 11 13 12 13 12 
E 9 8 7 6 2 7 3 7 7 6 1 9 9 6 
F 2 6 3 5 1 4 2 3 4 3 3 7 7 3 
IRL 7 9 14 13 11 10 12 12 9 14 12 11 11 1 
I 6 7 4 1 3 3 6 5 5 2 5 6 8 7 
L 5 14 12 14 14 8 14 11 13 13 14 14 14 14 
NL 1 5 2 4 6 6 5 7 6 4 6 5 5 4 
A 12 11 1 9 10 11 12 5 9 10 10 10 10 13 
p 10 13 11 12 2 7 11 10 12 11 12 13 12 11 
FIN 11 4 10 11 13 14 10 13 10 8 9 11 2 10 
s 8 1 9 8 9 9 9 9 8 6 7 8 1 8 
UK 4 3 5 3 5 5 1 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 
* Th1s table shows the ranks that the reporter country marks 1n terms of the level of 1ts contnbut1ons of trade benef1ts to the partner country. 
The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (I). 
(-> :Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 6- 1. Country Ranks in Gaining Trade Benefits 
-1994 
..... Partner Countries 
IReoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 8 5 7 7 3 7 8 2 7 7 8 6 
DK 8 7 10 12 9 9 10 8 9 8 3 1 
D 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 
EL 12 13 ll 10 12 12 6 13 ll 13 13 13 
E 7 10 8 6 4 8 3 7 8 1 9 10 
F 2 6 2 4 1 3 2 4 3 2 6 7 
IRL 10 12 13 12 13 10 13 10 13 12 12 ll 
I 5 7 4 1 4 2 5 5 2 5 7 8 
L 
NL 1 5 1 5 6 6 4 7 4 6 5 5 
A 9 11 3 8 9 ll 12 5 11 ll 10 9 
p 8 9 12 13 2 7 ll ll 12 12 ll 12 
FIN ll 4 10 ll ll 13 lO 12 9 10 10 2 
s 6 1 9 9 8 8 6 9 6 6 9 1 
UK 4 3 6 3 5 5 1 4 3 5 4 4 4 
* Th1s table demonstrates the ranks that the reporter country marks 1n terms of the level of 1ts ga1n1ng the benefits from the trades 
with the partner country. The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (II). Luxembourg is 





































Table 6- 2. Country Ranks in Gaining Trade Benefits 
-1998 
..... Partner Countries 
Reoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 8 6 7 7 4 5 8 2 7 7 8 6 
DK 10 8 9 12 10 9 11 8 10 9 3 1 
D 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 
EL 13 13 12 11 13 13 7 13 11 13 13 13 
E 7 9 7 6 2 8 3 7 8 1 9 9 
F 2 6 2 4 1 3 2 4 3 3 7 7 
IRL 8 10 13 13 10 9 13 10 13 12 11 11 
I 5 7 4 1 4 3 6 5 2 5 6 8 
L 
NL 1 5 1 5 6 6 4 6 4 6 5 5 
A 12 11 3 11 9 11 12 5 11 11 10 10 
p 9 12 10 12 2 7 11 10 12 12 12 12 
FIN 11 3 11 10 13 12 10 12 9 9 10 2 
s 6 1 9 8 8 8 7 9 6 6 8 1 
UK 4 4 5 3 5 5 1 4 3 5 4 4 4 
* Th1s table demonstrates the ranks that the reporter country marks 1n terms of the level of 1ts ga1n1ng the benefits from the trades 
with the partner country. The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (II). Luxembourg is 
added to Belgium until 1998. (-> : Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
















Table 6- 3. Country Ranks in Gaining Trade Benefits 
-2002 
-> Partner Countries 
IReoorte B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s 
B 9 6 7 7 4 2 8 3 2 8 7 8 7 
DK 13 8 8 11 11 8 11 8 9 11 9 3 1 
D 2 2 2 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
EL 14 12 13 8 13 13 6 11 12 10 12 11 13 
E 9 8 7 5 2 7 3 6 7 6 1 9 9 
F 3 6 3 4 1 4 2 2 4 3 3 7 6 
IRL 7 10 14 13 12 10 13 14 10 14 13 12 11 
I 5 7 4 1 3 3 6 13 5 2 5 6 8 
L 6 14 12 14 14 8 14 14 14 13 14 14 14 
NL 1 5 1 6 6 6 5 7 5 4 6 5 5 
A 12 11 2 11 10 12 12 5 7 11 10 10 10 
p 10 13 11 12 2 7 11 10 10 13 12 13 12 
FIN 11 4 10 10 13 14 10 12 12 8 9 11 2 
s 8 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 7 8 1 
UK 4 3 5 3 5 5 1 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 
.. 
* Th1s table demonstrates the ranks that the reporter country marks 1n terms of the level of 1ts ga1n1ng the benefits from the trades 
with the partner country. The ranks have been determined based on the relative size of principal trade benefits (II). 
(-> :Table reading direction) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
D Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 

















Table 7. Number of Countries with an Increase in 3 Year Moving Averages of Basic Trade Benefits 
I - II II - Ill Ill - IV IV - v v- VI VI VII 
B 11 12 10 8 8 4 
OK 11 12 9 8 8 7 
D 10 4 7 7 6 7 
EL 12 9 11 12 11 5 
E 12 8 9 10 7 6 
F 13 7 6 7 5 7 
IRL 7 5 10 8 6 5 
I 13 8 8 7 6 8 
L 9 
NL 13 10 8 7 6 8 
A 5 9 8 8 8 8 
p 9 4 3 3 5 4 
FIN 10 9 9 8 7 10 
s 9 9 6 6 6 8 
UK 11 4 6 5 9 9 
.. 
* Th1s table Introduces the number of partner countnes w1th wh1ch a spec1f1c trading country can keep an 1ncreas1ng trend 




















UK United Kingdom 
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1:1994-96 
II : 1995- 97 
111:1996-98 
IV: 1997- 99 
v: 1998- 00 
VI : 1999- 01 
VII : 2000- 02 
Table 8. Comparison between 3 Year Moving Averages of CTB and a Specific Year's CTB 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
B A A A A A A A: 6 s: 0 
DK s A A s s s A: 2 s: 4 
D A A A A A s A: 5 s: 1 
EL A s A A A s A: 4 s: 2 
E A s s s s s A: 1 s: 5 
F A A A s A A A: 5 s: 1 
IRL A s s A A s A: 3 s: 3 
I s A A A s A A: 4 s: 2 
L s A: 0 s: 1 
NL s A s s A A A: 3 s: 3 
A A s s s A A A: 3 s: 3 
p A s A s s A A: 3 s: 3 
FIN A A s A s A A: 4 s: 2 
s s A A A s s A: 3 s: 3 
UK A A s s A s A: 3 s: 3 
" 
". * CTB stands for Complementary Trade Benef1ts. A 1nd1cates that, for example, when 3 year average of CTB for 1994 96 IS 
bigger than CTB of 1996, CTB of 1997 has turned out to be bigger than that of 1996. "A" also indicates that when 3 year averagE 
of CTB for 1994- 96 is smaller than CTB of 1996, CTB of 1997 has turned out to be smaller than that of 1996. Meanwhile, 
"S" means that when a specific year's CTB is bigger than 3 year moving average of CTB, the next year's CTB has turned out to 






















Table 9. Export Share by Country 
( "'< ) 0 
EU-15 B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
1996 100.0 9.8 2.5 22.1 0.4 5.3 14.0 2.5 10.3 12.3 2.7 1 .4 1.6 3.5 10.9 
1997 100.0 9.7 2.4 21.5 0.4 5.2 14.1 2.7 10.0 12.4 2.8 1.4 1.6 3.4 11 . 7 
1998 100.0 9.8 2.3 21.7 0.4 5.6 14.1 3.1 9.9 11 .9 2.9 1 .4 1. 7 3.4 11 .2 
1999 100.0 9.5 2.3 21 .9 0.4 5.2 14.2 3.2 9.6 0.4 12.1 2.9 1 .4 1.7 3.4 11 . 1 
2000 100.0 9.6 2.3 21 .5 0.3 5.5 13.9 3.3 9.2 0.4 12.6 2.8 1.3 1.7 3.3 11 . 2 
2001 100.0 10.0 2.3 21.9 0.2 5.8 13.7 3.6 9.0 0.5 12.6 3.0 1.3 1 .6 2.8 10.9 
2002 100.0 10.2 2.5 22.2 0.3 5.5 13.4 3.8 8.8 0.5 12.4 3.1 1.3 1 .6 2.9 10.9 
* Luxembourg is added to Belgium until1998. 
Table 10. Import Share by Country 
( "'< ) 0 
EU-15 B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
1996 100.0 9.1 2.4 21.3 1.4 6.4 15.4 1. 7 9.8 9.0 3.9 2.0 1 .5 3.5 12.0 
1997 100.0 8.9 2.5 20.9 1 .3 6.0 14.9 1.9 10.1 8.8 3.8 2.1 1.6 3.5 13.1 
1998 100.0 8.8 2.4 20.5 1.4 7.1 15.3 1 .9 10.0 8.4 3.7 2.2 1.6 3.4 12.6 
1999 100.0 8.5 2.3 20.1 1 .5 6.8 15.5 2.1 9.9 0.6 8.3 3.8 2.3 1.5 3.4 12.7 
2000 100.0 8.8 2.2 19.8 1.3 7.5 16.0 2.3 9.8 0.6 8.1 3.6 2.1 1.5 3.3 12.3 
2001 100.0 9.2 2.2 19.9 1 . 1 7.6 15.8 2.4 9.7 0.7 7.9 3.7 2.1 1.5 3.0 12.3 
2002 100.0 9.9 2.4 19.3 1 . 1 7.1 15.3 2.4 9.7 0.7 8.2 3.7 2.0 1 .5 3.1 12.8 
* Luxembourg is added to Belgium until1998. 
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Table 11 - 1. INTRA-EU Trade Balance 
-1994 
--> Partner Countries 
Reports B OK D EL E F IRL I L 
B 436 4 557 583 1 772 6 630 -581 1 791 
OK -451 1 498 200 278 298 -55 26 
D 1 487 518 1 377 2 474 6 839 -2 067 593 
EL -560 -197 -1 292 -393 -1 036 -129 -1 917 
E -1 060 -232 -2 758 376 -1 095 -422 -846 
F -3 718 -168 -4 854 1 047 2 077 -1 551 -64 
IRL 804 122 2 546 133 482 1 918 708 
I -2 002 -48 3 318 1 776 2 003 1 796 -784 
L 
NL 4 635 778 10 971 1 088 1 296 5 151 -587 2 920 
A 631 49 4 166 10 185 465 146 1 029 
p 
-223 153 -303 40 -2 335 -693 -79 -1 441 
FIN -10 248 385 89 299 442 -31 -41 
s 916 507 -1 501 193 320 29 -30 195 
UK 364 -475 -5 943 735 1 811 -1 960 1 704 -936 















I Italy UK United Kingdom 








NL A p FIN s UK 
-2 748 573 438 -229 -1 489 100 
-660 62 -208 -168 -42 951 
-7 301 5 297 330 -763 938 8 487 
-1 150 -76 -33 -105 -217 -655 
-981 -264 2 720 -428 -436 -1 215 
-4 178 528 831 -519 -195 3 729 
895 129 72 105 316 -873 
-3 534 766 1 687 -175 -323 1 783 
549 347 -553 -725 2 023 
272 98 121 287 147 
-169 -11 47 109 260 
567 38 -54 624 901 
797 97 -226 -434 664 
-750 -6 -32 -1 175 -933 
Table 11 - 2. INTRA-EU Trade Balance 
- 1998 (Million ECU/Euro) 
~ Partner Countries 
Reoorte B OK 0 EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
B 636 3 338 797 3 021 8 552 -2 901 3 494 4 115 935 571 60 1 362 3 639 
OK -564 136 289 451 73 -130 141 1 029 45 141 244 515 918 
0 948 1 025 1 906 5 825 6 485 -4 704 3 546 13 808 8 787 1 120 648 3 099 12 994 
EL 767 309 2 240 709 1 866 152 3 151 1 380 151 39 267 411 1 043 
E 2 231 281 6 045 740 3 565 1 138 2 836 3 209 467 5 937 634 689 1 202 
F -5 594 131 -5 583 1 791 5 043 -2 329 -805 -7 118 739 1 202 -410 504 5 347 
IRL 3 119 316 6 115 133 1 126 3 305 1 281 1 911 237 147 29 722 -1 856 
I -3 413 135 -520 3 280 3 895 2 507 -1 268 -5 725 260 2 226 -281 -640 3 309 
L 
NL 5 706 1 541 19 392 1 223 2 620 8 896 -1 122 5 544 1 783 851 426 56 3 187 
A 590 71 7 857 149 791 366 129 332 1 673 55 188 173 589 
p 111 110 722 43 4 860 723 124 1 814 621 20 103 78 324 
FIN 68 -522 70 355 566 744 -11 382 -134 212 106 -708 1 654 
s 1 154 681 -2 424 376 995 162 -365 731 -107 -39 96 956 936 
UK -1 734 -218 -7 320 999 1 872 -2 019 3 001 -2 401 -915 -423 -149 -1 329 -371 
* Luxembourg IS added to Belgium unt1l 1998. (~ . Table read1ng d1rect1on) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
0 Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 11 - 3. INTRA-EU Trade Balance 
-2002 (Million ECU/Euro) 
-) 
· r.n,nt,;Ao 
B OK D EL E F IRL I L NL A P FIN I S UK 
B 768 6.123 1.134 4.327 10.63~ -12.946 3.912 2.787 -6.343 1.188 -199 -381 -1.448 6.437 
OK -=-873 _126 356 956 -75 213 -180 96 -826 -43 52 57C 888 1.305 
0 :-6,831 1,449 3,446 14,439 19,895 -2,462 1.1,_085 6741-19,857111.272 1.805 1.653 4.603 20,7§§_ 
EL -1 ,323 -261 -2,887 -999 -1 ,488 -184 -2,875 -3C -1 ,5§§. _-177 -1 _::-_273 -292 -6§± 
E -2,274 -319-12,636 1,081 -.1 O?R -1,588 -2,354 -174 -3,768 -809 7,078 -645 -81C 1,487 
F -7,916 -164-14,778 1,977 8,070 -1,961 761 58-10,9_Qll. _-398 1,374 -593 311 9,11Q 
IRL 12,532 -139 3,009 295 1,634 2,578 2,711 52 1,422 116 226 -76 824 -592 
I -3.081 2E -~308 4,30 5,062 3,288 -2,116 -39C -R?RRI-1,109 1,941 -229 -906 5,444 
-2.99: E -624 4 34 11 431 -161 29 62 102 101 474 
~ 9.4 1.4E ?~ ;:1~ 1.85 4.705 14 -1 '7 9.3 307 2,226 974 580 442 9.289 
A -7! 171 -9. 74 382 1.361 -152 2. -24 -1 :13 175 -113 -66 2,128 
P -1 5 -1 13 12 -S OSR -744 -115 -1 -14 -::18 -66 -114 -78 720 
FIN 244 -928 -224 333 746 717 24 34 -2C -::98 -: 15 -1.062 2.436 
s 1.373 -97C .~as 255 985 607 -721 75: -t:? 33 9! 1.175 1.155 
UK -2.747 -199 :-14.333 967 256 -577 10.057 -3.77 -233 -2.1891-1 .6~ -281 -2.061 -768 
(-):Table reading uu~~uunJ 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
0 Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Table 12. GDP of 15 EU Countries 
- 2003 (Billion USD) 
B OK 0 EL E F IRL I L NL A p FIN s UK 
335.9 235.4 2,698.3 171.0 841 .3 1,954.5 131.9 1,474.2 23.6 513.2 281 .8 147.7 180.9 302.0 1 '795 0 
Source. EIU Country Reports (April 2004) 
B Belgium I Italy UK United Kingdom 
OK Denmark L Luxembourg 
0 Germany NL Netherlands 
EL Greece A Austria 
E Spain p Portugal 
F France FIN Finland 
IRL Ireland s Sweden 
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Figure 4 - 2. 3 Year Moving Averages of Complementary Trade Benefits by Country 
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Figure 4 - 3. 3 Year Moving Averages of Complementary Trade Benefits by Country 
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